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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
22, Analysis of the MPS (16 January 1987). Prior results were
obtained independently and documented before starting the FMEA/CIL
assessment activity. Supplemental analysis was performed to
address failure modes not previously considered by the IOA. Each
sheet identifies the hardware item being analyzed and its failure
mode. Worst case criticality is identified at the top of each
sheet.




= Loss of life or vehicle
Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
- All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,






Is Checked Out PreFlight
= Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
= Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen













ITEM: FUSE ( DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA J _
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER :
CAUSES : PIECE-P_T STRUCTURA£ FA_ILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE ." _ _ ...............














REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 36.9
m
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REMOTE POWER CONTROLLERS, 3A (4)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
















LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PVI7, PVIS) NORMALLY CLOSED
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL OPEN THE LH2 RTLS INBD/OUTBD DUMP




REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-3
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LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM ....
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PVI7, PVIS) NORMALLY_CLOSED I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELKUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: _ --3/iR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : _PIEC_-iPART STRucTU_L :_AIL_, CONTAMinATiON; MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD ELIMINATE BLOCKING PROTECTION. A
SUBSEQUENT SHORT TO GROUND IN THE SAME DIODE WOULD ELIMINATE THE
ABILITY TO OPEN THE VALVE FOR LH2 MANIFOLD VENT AFTER MECO.





















































LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PVI7, PVI8) NORMALLY CLOSED
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD ELIMINATE A REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE
OPEN SOLENOID. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE LH2 MANIFOLD
VENT AFTER MECO. OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE COULD RESULT.



































LH2 RT_L8 DUMP sySTEM ........ :i_- :_Li ......
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PVI7, PVi8) NORMALLY CLOSED
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT _ HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: :...._ ....
causes: s uc n L MEC ICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ .... ;...._: _ : -: ....
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE VALVE
OPENING. AN INADVERENT OPEN COMMAND B WOULD OPEN A VALVE. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CREATE A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD ON THE PAD
OR DURING BOOST.



















































LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PVl7, PVI8) NORMALLY CLOSED
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/S-AFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WOULD ELIMINATE POWER TO THE OPEN SOLENOID AND
CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF THE RELIEF VALVE (FAILING CLOSED) WOULD
ALLOW OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE.
= =
w
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 15
w
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HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERS, TYPE I (2)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT












LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 RTL8 DUMP VALVES (PVI7, PVlS) NORMALLY CLOSED
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR -
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/! R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ] _
LOCATION: k
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK ....
EFFECTS/._;I ON__.A_-'____ _........ ---"
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYWILL 0_E_ THE LH2 RTLS .I_NBD/OUTBD_P " - ....
VALVES. THIS WILL CREATEA FIRE/EXPLOSIONH_ZARDON THEPAD OR
DURI_NGBOOST. --_-
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ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLERS, TYPE III (4)
















LH2 RTLS DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 RTLS DUMP VALVES (PVI7, PVI8) NORMALLY CLOSED
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL OPEN THE LH2 RTLS INBD/OUTBD DUMP
VALVES. THIS WILL CREATE A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD ON THE PAD OR
DURING BOOST.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-9
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_2 RT_ D_P SYSTEM i_7 :_
_2 RT_ D_P VALES (PVI7, PVI8) NO_Y C_SED _7ii
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR





A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: I ....
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE B_CKING REDUNDANCY. A SUBSEQUENT SHORT
TO GRO_D WI_ ELIMINATE BOTH OPEN SOLENOID PO_R PATHS AND C_SE















REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14 B
I






















LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE ONE POWER PATH TO OPEN THE SOLENOID.
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE COULD CLOSE THE VALVE. LOSS OF THE RELIEF
VALVE COULD RESULT IN OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14
I
w
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FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST : B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
3) LH2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN, TOPPING, & HI POINT BLEED VLVS
(PVI2, PVI3, PV22)







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE WILL PRECLUDE MPS DUM_P AND INERT .... HYDROGEN WILL
ESCAPE THROUGH THE RELIEF VALVE DURING ENTRY AND LANDING,
CREATING A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD. NO EFFECT ON RTLS BECAUSE RTLS
PUMP IS NOT MADE THROUGH FILL AND DRAIN VALVES.




































HIGH POINT OPEN HDC (2)
LOSS OF OUTPUT




SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CLOSES THE HIGH POINT BLEED VALVE AND PREVENTS ITS
OPERATION. FAILURE OF THE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE COULD THEN CAUSE
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RU_OF THE MPS.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 13
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/25/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR





LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1 ) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE iHDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF : 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR





A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE CAUSES THE LH2 TOPPING VALVE TO OPEN. FAILURE OF THE




































FILL AND DRAIN OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES A LOSS OF MANUAL OPEN COMMAND TO THE LH2 INBOARD
F/D VALVE. THIS WILL PREVENT OPENING FOR VACUUM INERT.
REFERENCES". VS72-941102 SHEET 13
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









FILL AND DRAIN OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM '
3) LH2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN, TOPPING, & HI POINT BLEED VLVS








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: -
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK ..................
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....... _
FIRST FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE REDUNDANCY AGAINST A PREMATURE
CLOSURE OF THE LH2 INBOARD F/D VALVE. A CONTACT SHORT TO POWER


















REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 13
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HIGH POINT OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES (2)
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: - -
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES THE HIGH POINT BLEED VALVE TO REMAIN CLOSED DURING
VACUUM INERT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE LH2 DUMP.
LH2 WILL VENT OVERBOARD DURING DESCENT AND LANDING.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 13
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-17
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HIGH POINT OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES (2)
SHORT , -
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM -- = :









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/1R RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTOFF : 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT : 3/3 AOA : 3/IR
DEORBIT : 3/3 ATO : 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 .........
R_.DUNDANCY SCR_.ENS : A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE HIGH POINT BLEED VALVE TO CLOSE AND REMAIN
CLOSED UNLESS _AL SWITCH IS MOVED TO OPEN. LOSS OF ALL















REFERENCES : VS72-941102 SHEET 13
























LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES A LOSS OF THE GND OPEN COMMAND. LOSS OF ALL




REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 13
i
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FILL _D D_IN _i MDM B_CKING DIODE (i)
SHORTS
_AD _ALYST: B. S_UGHTER SUBSYS _AD: W.J. MCNICOLL
B_AK_ HIE_CHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) _2 FI_ _D D_IN SYSTEM























A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
=:
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAIL_, CONT_INATION, MEC_ICAL
SHOCK, VIB_TION, THE_L SHOCK ....
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
NO AD_RSE EFFECT ON C_W OR VEHIC_.

















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/25/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT:




ITEM: HIGH POINT LA1 MDM BLOCKING DIODE (2)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF OPEN COMMAND TO THE HIGH POINT BLEED VALVE WHICH RESULTS
IN VALVE CLOSURE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE.
u REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 13
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-21
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET





ITEM: HIGH POINT LAI MDM BLOCKING DIODE (2)
FAILURE MODE: SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2)....u_2FiI_ AND DRA_NSY_,_, .....................









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/_ _ _
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK,_IBRA_qT_N, THERMAL SHOCK ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:









































HIGH POINT MONITOR RESISTORS, 5.1K (3)
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 13
w
REPORT DATE 03/II/88 E-23
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T._.AD _ALYST: B. S_UGHTER SUBSYS ;._.AD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAK_ HIE_CHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) _2 FILL _D D_IN SYS_ _
























CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAIL_, CONT_INATION, MEC_ICAL
SHOCK, VIB_TION, THE_L SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
FAILLE WILL _ NO _Z_DOUS EFFECT ON C_W OR _HIC_.










































OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
SHORT











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ELIMINATES BLOCKING PROTECTION BETWEEN THE OPEN
COMMAND AND CLOSE SOLENOID INHIBIT. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD
OPEN THE VALVE DURING BOOST.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14
















LAI MDM ISOLATION DIODE
OPEN ...........











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV11) _
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3_
LIFTO??: _ 3/3 TAL: 3/3 _-
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ] ........
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :__ __ ____ .... _ .....
_E FAILURE WiLL ELIMINATE THE GROUND OPEN COMMAND. _SS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD MAKE THE VALVE CLOSE DURING LOADING.
REFERENCES:
87










































LAI MDM ISOLATION DIODE
SHORT












LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WILL HAVE NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
87
DRAWING PPD41L OF THE MPS/EPDC REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
OPEN











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND D_IN VALVE (PVIi) _ f_
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3: ....
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
E FECTS/R TiONALE :
FAILURE WILL DISABLE THE OPENING OF THE LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND
DRAIN VALVE OPEN COMMAND. SECOND FAILURE COULD PRODUCE
OVERPRESSURIZ_TION AND RUPTURE.








































OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES A LOSS IN ISOLATION BETWEEN THE SWITCH AND
CIRCUIT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14














OPEN MDM ISOLATION DIODE
SHORT












LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVlI) .......
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/31-
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: _3/3 -_-
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: _ 3/3 ....
_/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION •
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW AND VEHICLE ........








































CLOSE SWITCH ISOLATION DIODE
SHORT












LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL CAUSE A LOSS IN BLOCKING BETWEEN THE CLOSE
COMMAND AND THE OPEN SOLENOID POWER INHIBIT. A PREMATURE CLOSE
COMMAND AND AN INADVERTENT OUTPUT FROM THE CLOSE HDC WOULD CLOSE
THE VALVE DURING LOADING.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-31
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















CLOSE MDM ISOLATION DIODE
SHORT _












LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVII)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: __ ...._ _
FAILURE _W!LL HAVEJO _ZARDOUS_ EFFECTON CREW OR VEHICLE.
.... z =






































TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES (2)
OPEN












LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVII)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES-. VS72-941102 SHEET 14
= REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES (2)
FAILURE MODE: SHORT












LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVII)
CRiTiCALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES A LOSS IN REDUNDANCY. SECOND FAILURE OF
DIODE I_Oq_EH S_LENOID HDC WOULD RESULT lq_ 5qqDRT LOSS OF POWER
TO THE OPEN SOLENOID. THIRD FAILURE - PREMATURE CLOSE SOLENOID
POWER wOUT.D c_SE THE OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE.
IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST FILL, THERE COULD BE A RUPTURE
AND FIRE HAZARD.

































ITEM: MONITORING RESISTORS, 2.2K (2)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
CAUSES THE LOSS OF A MONITOR.
FAILURE
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















SWITCH SCAN BLEED _SISTO_, 1.8K (2)
OPEN












_2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
_2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVII)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3}i
LIF_OFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 ......
_DING/SAFING: 3/3 .......
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
CAUSES THE LOSS OF A MONITOR.
FAILURE
















_PORT DATE 03/11/88 E-36
lm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
























LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVll)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14
u
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-37
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
























LH2 FILL AND DRAIN SYSTEM
LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVII)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: /NA AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES" P_ECE_PARTSTRUC_L FAILURE_ CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....... i........ _ _.:,_
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE CLOSE SONEOID
POWER. A SHORT FROM POWER TO THE CLOSE SOLENOID CONTROL CIRCUIT












REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41LI IN MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-
17 -87
mm










































LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF VALVE CLOSING SOLENOID (LV25)
PANEL R4 (SWITCH LOCATION)
TOGGLE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 " RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14
m



























SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
LH2 DUMP SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PVS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































ITEM: RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORT













LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PVS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ELIMINATES BLOCKING PROTECTION BETWEEN PARALLEL POWER
PATHS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD VENT H2 INTO ATMOSPHERE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14
i
u
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT TO GROUND












LH2 DUMP SYSTEM _ =::_::_ : ........
LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE ONE OF TWO PATHS FOR CLOSE SOLENOID
POWER. A SECOND FAILURE WILL OPEN THE LH2 RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE,
































































LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE ELIMINATES THE REDUNDANCY OF TWO SEPARATE
PATHS. A PREMATURE CLOSE B COMMAND COULD THEN CLOSE THE VALVE
AND POSSIBLY RUPTURE THE MPS.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14
i
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-43
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT : 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT : 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFiNG: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/_T_IQNALE :
THE FiRS_ _FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE CLOSE_S6tENOID POWER
PATH. A SECOND FAILURE WILL OPEN THE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE BUT _










































RPC A OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT













LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PVS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE SOME BLOCKING REDUNDANCY. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD VENT H2 INTO THE ATMOSPHERE DURING
BOOST.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RPC A OUTPUT DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO GROUND













LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PV8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF ONE REDUNDANT CLOSE SOLENOID
POWER PATH. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO H2 BEING VENTED
INTO THE ATMOSPHE_DURING BOOST.













































FAIL OPEN, SHORT, INADVERTENT OPERATION













LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION VALVE (PVS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL CAUSE A LOSS IN THE MONITORING OF LH2 RELIEF
SHUTOFF VALVE POSITION.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 14
w
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















CLOSE HDC (TYPE I)
FAILS ON













LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 .....
REDUNDANCY SC_ENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
P_T _BER:
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_LFAIL_, CONT_INATION, MEc_ICAL
SHOCK, VIB_TION, THE_L SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
FAIL_ WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY IN CLOSE SO_NOID CIRCUIT. SECOND
FAI_RE WILL APPLY_POWER TO C_SE SO_NOID BUT BIST-ABLE FEA_
GIVES RED_DANCY. LOSS OF ALL _DUNDANCY COULD CLOSE THE VALVE
_IT._ THE SSME's ME R_NING RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
MPS RU_E AND FIRE.








































OPEN HDC (TYPE I)
FAIL ON













LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE ERODES REDUNDANCY. SECOND FAILURE (PREMATURE OPEN
C COMMAND) WILL APPLY POWER TO OPEN SOLENOID, BUT BISTABLE
FEATURE WILL MAINTAIN VALVE POSITION.
m
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHEET 15
= r
I
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















CLOSE HDC, TYPE III (2)
FAIL ON













LH2 FEEDLINE DIs_o_ECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/iR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ _ _-
FIRST FAILURE ERODE WILL REDUNDANCY OF PREMATURE CLOSE SOLENOID
POWER. SECOND FAILURE (PREMATURE CLOSE CMD C) WILL APPLY POWER
TO THE C_SE SOLEONID, B_BISTABLE FEATURE WILL MAINTAIN
REDUNDANCY. PARALLEL PATH MASKS FAILURE.
=

















































DIODE, CLOSE RPC B OUTPUT
SHORT













LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURALFAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF REDUNDANT BLOCKING PROTECTION.
SECOND FAILURE (SERIES RPC BLOCKING DIODE SHORTS) RESULTS IN
PARALLEL RPC HAVING ITS OUTPUT TIED TO GROUND. CURRENT LIMIT
WILL TRIP ELIMINATING POWER TO CLOSE SOLENOID. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN VALVE CLOSURE WHILE SSME's ARE RUNNING
CAUSING POSSIBLE MPS RUPTURE AND FIRE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHEET 15















DIODE, CLOSE RPC B OUTPUT
SHORT TO GROUND











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
HYDROGEN FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFiNG: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ p ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS RAtIONALE: ...._ _ __r -___ _- _
P-TERMINAL OF DIODE WOULD SHORT TO GROUND. THIS WOULD ELIMINATE
A REDUNDANT PATH FOR OPEN SOLENOID POWER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
!coUL-D RESULT-IN-V-ALVE--dLOS_ _ILE SSME s ARE RUNNING CAUSING _

















REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHEET 15
J









































LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
I2tNDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF REDUNDANCY AGAINST APPLYING CLOSE SOLENOID
POWER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN VALVE CLOSURE
WHILE SSME's ARE RUNNING CAUSING POSSIBLE MPS RUPTURE AND FIRE.
i
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-53
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/I_
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: P_PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE"
FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF POWER TO CLOSE SOLENOID. FAILURE TO





















REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHEET 15






















DIODE, OPEN RPC B OUTPUT
SHORT













LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF REDUNDANT BLOCKING PROTECTION.
SECOND FAILURE (SERIES RPC BLOCKING DIODE SHORTS) RESULTING IN
PARALLEL RPC HAVING ITS OUTPUT TIED TO GROUND. CURRENT LIMIT
WILL TRIP ELIMINATING POWER TO OPEN SOLENOID.
u
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DIODE, OPEN RPC B OUTPUT
SHORT TO GROUND













LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: _/iR _
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: J _
THE P-TERMINAL OF THE DIODE WOULD SHORT TO GROUND. THIS WOULD
ELIMINATE A REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO OPEN SOLENOID. A SECOND _
FAILURE (THE SAME DIODE SHORTING)_ WOULD ELIMINATE O_EN SOLENOID
POWER DUE TO PARALLEL OUTPUT RPC BEING SHORTED TO GROUND.
BISTABLE FEATURE WOULD STILL MAINTAIN THE VALVE.














































LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) HYDROGEN FEED SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3-- RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IN OPEN SOLENOID CIRCUITRY. A
SECOND FAILURE (OPEN SOLENOID HDCI FAILING ON) WILL APPLY POWER
TO OPEN SOLENOID. BISTABLE FEATURE MAINTAINS REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHEET 15
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-57
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LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL :
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF ALL OPEN COMMANDS. A PREMATURE
ACTUATION OF THE CLOSE SOLENOID COULD CLOSE THE VALVE WHILE















REFE_ES : RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHEET 15 W i
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OPEN POSITION SWITCH MONITOR RESISTOR (I)
OPENS













LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKS_ET









ITEM: OPEN HDC, TYPE III (2)
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL SHORT












HYDROGEN FEED SYSTEM .........
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2) : _
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F_C
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/iR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE=_ _ _:_:_ ......_
FIRST FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE REDUNDANCY IN THE OPEN SOLENOID
CIRCUITRY. SECOND FAILURE WILL APPLY OPEN SOLENOID POWER. (i.e.
INABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE ELECTRICALLY) MEC_ICAL REDUNDANCY



















REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHEET 15

























DIODE, CLOSE RPC C OUTPUT
SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPD&C/MPS







LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF REDUNDANT BLOCKING PROTECTION. SECOND
FAILURE (SERIES RPC SHORTING TO GROUND) WILL RESULT IN ABILITY TO




REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHEET 15
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DIODE, CLOSE RPC C OUTPUT
SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: WoJ. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPD&C/MPS
2) HYDROGEN FEED SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ] _
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAuSEs: PIECE-PARTS_C_RAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIQNALE_ _ ......
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF A REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE CLOSE
SOLENOID. A SECOND FAILURE COULD ELIMINATE CLOSE SOLENOID POWER.
MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY WILL STILL CLOSE THE VALVE.
















































ITEM: DIODE, OPEN RPC C OUTPUT
FAILURE MODE: SHORT













LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SECOND FAILURE COULD ELIMINATE OPEN SOLENOID POWER OR REDUNDANCY
TO PREVENT PREMATURE CLOSURE. THIRD FAILURE COULD CLOSE THE
VALVE WHILE SSME's ARE RUNNING.
w REFERENCES". RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHEET 15
u
=
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DIODE, OPEN RPC C OUTPUT
SHORT TO GRO_D













_2 FEEDLINE DISCO_E_ VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT
P__C_H: 3/IR ..... RT_:












CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUCT_L FAILU_, CONT_INATION, _C_NICAL
SHOCK, VIB_TION, THE_L SHOCK
EF?ECTS/_TIONA_: ............. .......i_.....
FAIL_ WI_IMINATE ONE _D_D_T OPEN SO?._.NOID POWER PATH.
OPEN SOT._.NOID POWER COULD BE _ST ON A SECON_FAILU_. THIRD
FAILLE COULDC_SE THE VAL_:_I_ SSME's _E R_ING_

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET










FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT













LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL PREVENT VALVE CLOSURE DUE TO THE BISTABLE VALVE
FEATURE. THE FAILURE IS i/I FOR AN ABORT SINCE A FAILED ENGINE
MIGHT NEED PROPELLANT ISOLATION.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 16
w
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LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL PREVENT VALVE OPENING. A SECOND FAILURE COULD
CLOSE THE VALVE PREMATURELY. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD
OVERPRESSURIZE THE SYSTEM AND CAUSE A RUPTURE.































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: / ........
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
























































FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN













LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE DOES NOT CREATE A HAZARDOUS CONDITION FOR CREW OR
VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 16
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-69
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HDC - GND C/O COMMAND POWER (5)
LOSS OF OUTPUT












LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .... _ _
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 26



































HDC - GND C/O COMMAND POWER (5)
PREMATURE OUTPUT












LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE VALVE
ACTUATION. A SECOND FAILURE COULD CLOSE OR OPEN ALL FLOW CONTROL
VALVES.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 26
F
w
















LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS





















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE"
THE FAILURE WILL EFFECT A MONITOR. THE FAILUREWILL HAVE NO
HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW 0R_ICLE.







































TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES (3)












LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCES".































LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 P_SSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 373
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEdRBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ] :<_:_<_::
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
_,_i_i_ _:__ _ _ _ :± : _ _i_i_
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:








































HDC, RELAY CONTROL POWER (3)
LOSS OF OUTPUT












LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL OPEN ONE FLOW CONTROL VALVE PREMATURELY. A
SECOND FAILURE COULD OVERPRESSURIZE THE ET. FIRST FAILURE DURING
ABORTS CAN CREATE SUCH A HAZARD.
h.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 21
m
w














HDC, RELAY CONTROL POWER (3)












LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES















cAUsEs : PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE; CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL




























































LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL OPEN ONE FLOW CONTROL VALVE PREMATURELY. A
SECOND FAILURE COULD OVERPRESSURE THE ET. FIRST FAILURE DURING
ABORTS CAN CREATE SUCH A HAZARD.

















FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT












LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R _:_ TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR





A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
THISF ILUR WOULDCLOSE SO OID. A SECONDFArLm COULD
CLOSE A SECOND VALVE. LOW ULLAGE PRESSURE COULD CAUSE IMPLOSION
DUE TO FLIGHT LOADS.



























































LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. A SECOND FAILURE
WOULD ALLOW THE SPARE TRANSDUCER TO DRIVE TWO VALVES. A THIRD
FAILURE COULD OVERPRESSURIZE THE ET.
L
REFERENCES". VS72-941102 SHEET 26
w
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LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION F_W COBOL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LAN_NG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION , THERMAL SHOCK ..............
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AND ALLOW THE SPARE
TRANSDUCER TO CONTROL TWO VALVES. SECOND FAILURE WOULD ACTIVATE
THE STANDBY TRANSDUCER. A FAILURE OF THE STANDBY TRANSDUCER
COULD THEN OVERPRESSURIZE TH ET.
















































FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO XFER TO OPEN












LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE CLOSURES.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL ALLOW FLOW CONTROL VALVES TO CLOSE
AND CAUSE LOW PRESSURE IN LH2 TANK,
m_
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 23
=
nw_





























LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 P_SSURiZATION FLOW tbNTR--bL_vALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: i/i _
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LAN--D_N_/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL _FAILURE, CONTAMI_A_ION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
ONE CONTACT SHORT WILL OPEN ONE VALVE. SECOND CONTACT SHORT
COULD OVERPRESSURIZE THE ET. FIRST FAILURE DURING ABORTS CAN












REFERENCES: VS72-94!I02 SHEET 26



















FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO GROUND












LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE MANUAL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN A FLOW
CONTROL VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO LOW LH2
PRESSURES AND CREATE A HAZARD TO CREW AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 26
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-83
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LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART_ER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE MANUAL REDUNDANCY TO OPEN A FLOW
CONTROL VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO LOW LH2































































LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM














REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 26
l-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-85
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_2 TANK PRESS_IZATION SYSTEM



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_CATION:
PART _BER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAIL_, CONT_INATION, MEC_ICAL
sHOCK, VIB_TION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
THE FAILURE WILL NOT HAVE A HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.















































SWITCH SCAN BLEED RESISTOR












LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 26
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















SW SCAN DIODES (3)
OPEN












LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM ......
GH2 PRESSURIZATION F_W CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/_ _
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/I
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PARTSTRUCTURALFAIL - ,CONT INATION,MEC ICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.














































SWITCH SCAN DIODES (3)
SHORT












LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY. A SECOND SWITCH SCAN
DIODE SHORTING WOULD CONNECT ONE SWITCH CONTACT TO TWO FLOW
CONTROL VALVES. A SHORT TO POWER COULD THEN OVERPRESSURIZE THE
ET.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 26
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-89
w
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MDM INHIBIT COMMAND DIODES (6)
OPEN












LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/ TI  :
THE FAILURE CAUSES A LOSS IN THE MDM CAPABILITY TO INHIBIT CLOSE
SOLENOID POWER: .....A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO THE
CLOSURE OF FLOW CONTROL VALVES AND LOW ULLAGE PRESSURE IN THE LH2
TANK.



















































MDM INHIBIT COMMAND DIODES (6)
SHORT












LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, LV57, LV58)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL NOT HAVE A HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.





REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-91
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LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _ .....




CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/P.AT!ON   
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT PowER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME
BURN. THIS WOULDRESULT IN UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND
EXPLOSION.























































LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS








LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR





A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE POWER TO THE
LOCK SOLENOID. A LOSS OF _L_L__TRICAL _D_MEC_ICAL
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DURING SEPARATION.
J
m
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
[]
W
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-93
w
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/10/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT:



















SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
LH2 PROPEL_T FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT _TCH _D2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ....
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RAT_0_LE: _' ....
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE UNLOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MEC_ICAL REDUNDm_CY COULD CAUSE
ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DURING SEPARATION.
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87

































LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE POWER TO THE
UNLOCK SOLENOID. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER
CLOSURE DURING SSME BURN. THIS WOULD RESULT IN UNCONTAINED
ENGINE DAMAGE AND EXPLOSION.
w
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-95
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_2 PROPEL_T FEED SYSTEM
_2 FEEDLINE DISCO_ECT _TCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_NC
P_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SC_ENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
P_T _BER:
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAILU_, CONT_INATION, _C_ICAL
SHOCK, VIB_TION, THE_L SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
THE FAIL_ WILL ERODE _DUND_T PO_R TO THE _CK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL RED_D_CY COULD AL_W F_PPER C_S_ DURING SS_


















REFE_NCES: D_WING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC _A _VIEW S_Y 8-17-87


























LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE POWER TO THE
LOCK SOLENOID. A LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DURING SEPARATION.
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
w
































LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/iR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
THE FAILUR_-W"ILL ERODE RE=,,,=,=.,_,_=OWER TO THE UNLOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE














REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDCFMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87


































LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE POWER TO THE
UNLOCK SOLENOID. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER
CLOSURE DURING SSME BURN. THIS WOULD RESULT IN UNCONTAINED
ENGINE DAMAGE AND EXPLOSION.
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-99
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LOCK HDC iII (2)
LOSS OF OUTPUT











LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/iR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES_ _ -PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ .;_i_ _!_ _
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME
BURN. THIS WOULD RESULT-IN UNCONTAiNED ENGINE DAMAGE AND _-
EXPLOSION. _ ................


































ITEM: LOCK HDC III (2)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHAS E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF : 3/IR TAL : 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR





A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE POWER TO THE
LOCK SOLENOID. A LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DURIN_SEPARATION.
m




REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-101
m
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LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
P_T _BER:
CAusEs. PIECE-P_T STRUCTU_L FAIL_E, CONT_INATION, MEC_ICAL
SHOCK, VIB_TION, THE_L SHOCK
THE FAILU_ WILL ERODE _DUNDANT PO_R TO THE UNLOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MEC_ICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE



































UNLOCK HDC III (2)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE POWER TO THE
UNLOCK SOLENOID. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER
CLOSURE DURING SSME BURN. THIS WOULD RESULT IN UNCONTAINED
ENGINE DAMAGE AND EXPLOSION.
i
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
m
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-103
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LOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
OPEN












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/I_ _
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
P_T _BER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ _ _ ..... _......
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME

















REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC _A REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87



































LOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE BLOCKING REDUNDANCY IN THE LOCK SOLENOID
CIRCUIT. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE
DURING SSME BURN. THIS WOULDRESULT IN UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE
AND EXPLOSION
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-105
I
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LOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT TO GROUND












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATI ONALE :
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY Cou£D ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME
BURN. THIS WOULD RESULT IN CONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE AND
EXPLOSION.











































UNLOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
OPEN












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE UNLOCK SOLENOID.
LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DURING SEP_TION.
A
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87

















UNLOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR _
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCYSC E"S" A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECF.-PART_S_UC_RAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION,- MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: _ _ _ ......... _ ......
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE BLOCKING REDUNDANCY IN THE UNLOCK SOLENOID
CIRCUIT. A LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY














































ITEM: UNLOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO GROUND












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE UNLOCK SOLENOID.
LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
oRBITER/ET RECONTACT:DuRING SEPA_TION' ..............
A
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
z
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LOCK RPC CROSSOVER DIODE
OPEN












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORB_T: 3/3 ATO: 3/iR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS". A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION' MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _-
THE FAILUI_E WILL ERODE REDUNDq_T POWEI_II_ THELOCK S_OID
CIRCUIT. A LOSS OF ALL RED UND_ANCYCOULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE
DURING SSME BURN. THIS WOULD RESULT IN UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE
AND EXPLOSION.

















































LOCK RPC CROSSOVER DIODE
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ERODES BLOCKING REDUNDANCY IN THE OPEN SOLENOID
CIRCUIT. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE
DURING SSME BURN. THIS WOULD RESULT IN UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE
AND EXPLOSION.
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LOCK RPC CROSSOVER DIODE
SHORT TO GROUND












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK ......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ __--
THE FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE POWER TO THE OPEN SOLENOID. A LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME BURN.

















REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC _A REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87 H i
m
mm

























UNLOCK RPC CROSSOVER DIODE
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM













REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE UNLOCK SOLENOID.






REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41S! MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-II3
w
INDEPENDENT0_BITER ASSESSMENT















UNLOCK RPC CROSSOVER DIODE _
OPEN












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM .....
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT _TcH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE _ HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 _ RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEO_RBIT : - 3/IR ATO: 371R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIO_LE :
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE BLOCKING REDUNDANCY IN THE UNLOCK SOLENOID
CIRCUIT. A LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY
























UNLOCK RPC CROSSOVER DIODE
SHORT TO GROUND












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE POWER TO THE UNLOCK SOLENOID.
OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DURING SEPARATION.
A LOSS
t
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
=
w



















TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODES (2)
ALL
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM _: ....
3) LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
FLIGHT_P--HASE HDW/_JNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/iR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
_Z_Z_:_:_ -_ _:_T_ _ _:_ _ __ _Y 7_z_: _ ! _,i "_ .......
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
THE FAILURE OF THE DIODE PLUS THE FAILURE OF AN INTERNAL HDC
DIODE WILL GROUND A SOLENOID. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE. .......











































ITEM: UNLOCK POSITION SWITCH MONITOR RESISTORS (2)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURES HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-f17
b
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















LOCK POSITION SWITCH MONITOR RESISTORS (2)
OPEN












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:









REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
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RPC AND SOLENOID POWER MONITOR RESISTORS (6)
OPEN












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
m
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-II9
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















LOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE_ _ _
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM ....








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIEC_-P_T STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALEk_ _i_:_ _ !:_!::_z ! ;_::_ i_;:_ _ _ _ _
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME




















REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87






























LOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ERODES BLOCKING PROTECTION IN THE LOCK SOLENOID
CIRCUIT. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE
DURING SSME BURN. THIS WOULD RESULT IN UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE
AND EXPLOSION.





REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-121
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LH2 PROPEL_T FEED SYSTEM ....
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR





A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME











REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
i





ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
u
DATE: 2/11/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT:











UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
OPEN












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE UNLOCK SOLENOID.
LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DURING SEPARATION.
A
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-123
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT














UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM ....... _,,_,








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P__H: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/i_ ....
DEORBIT: 3/iR ATO: 3/1R ........
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION-.
PART NUMBER-
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE BLOCKING REDUNDANCY IN THE UNLOCK SOLENOID
CIRCUIT. A LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY













REFERENCES:DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
m























ITEM: UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO GROUND












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME




REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41SI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-87
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-125
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LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD2)
7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATiONALE :
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/29/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT:






LH2 PREVALVE TOGGLE SWITCHES (3)
OPEN CONTACTS SHORT TO GROUND












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/iR AOA: 3/iR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE OPEN SOLENOID POWER. A LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE, RUPTURE, OR A
FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND I0
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-127
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LH2 PREVALVE TOGGLE SWITCHES (3)
CLOSE CONTACTS SHORT TO GROUND











LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFEcTs/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE OPEN SOLENOID POWER. A LOSS OF ALL













REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND I0
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-128
w
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LH2 PREVALVES OPEN COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT DIODES,
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE REDUNDANT PATHS FOR OPEN SOLENOID
POWER. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CLOSE THE PREVALVE
PREMATURELY.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND I0
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-129
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










LH2 PREVALVES OPEN COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT DIODES,
SHORT TO GROUND












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
...... CR!TICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/IR AOA: 3/!R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK "
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE_W!LLELIMINATE REDUNDANT PATHS FOR OPENSOLENOID
POWER. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CLOSE THE PREVALVE
PREMATURELY.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND i0













LH2 PREVALVE OPEN RPC CROSSOVER DIODES, 12A (3)
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL CONNECT THE TWO PATHS FOR OPEN SOLENOID
POWER. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CLOSE THE PREVALVE
PREMATURELY.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND i0
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-131
w
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LH2 PREVALVE OPEN RPC CROSSOVER DIODES, 12A (3)
SHORT TO GROUND












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES














A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _-. ........ _-
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE REDUNDANT PATHS FOR OPEN
SOLENOID POWER. A SECOND FAILURE COULD CLOSE THE PREVALVE
PREMATURELY.


































LH2 PREVALVE CLOSE COMMAND A RPC OUTPUT DIODES,
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CR_TICA LITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ERODES REDUNDANCY IN THE CLOSE SOLENOID POWER
CIRCUIT. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY
TO ISOLATE A FAILED SSME.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND i0
m
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-133
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LH2 PREVALVE CLOSE COMMAND A RPC OUTPUT DIODES,
SHORT TO GROUND












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
CRITICALITIES












C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THE_L SHOCK _ _ .....
EFFECTS/RATIO_LE:
THE FAILURE ELIMINATES A POWER PATH TO THE CLOSE SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN THE INABILITY TO ISOLATE A
FAILED SSME.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND i0



































LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE RPC CROSSOVER DIODES, 12A (3)
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART sTRuCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY IN THE CLOSE SOLENOID POWER
CIRCUIT. THE LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN THE
INABILITY TO ISOLATE A FAILED SSME.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND i0
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-135
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 PREVALVE CLOSE RPC CROSSOVER DIODE, 12A (3)
SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1 ) EPD & C/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF : 2/1R TAL:
ONORBIT : 2/IR AOA:










A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ _ .... _ ....
THE FAILURE_WIL_--ELIMINATE CLOSE SOLENOID PowER. _ASUBSEQUENT
FAILED SSME COULD NOT BE ISOLATED.







































LH2 PREVALVES OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODES (3)
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, C6NTAM_NAT_N, _ MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND I0
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-137
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODES (3 )
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM ....
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LA/_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS FAILURE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND i0
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-138
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















LH2 PREVALVES OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODES (3)












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND I0
REPORT DATE 03/I1/88 E-139
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















LH2 PREVALVE CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODES (3)
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMALSHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND i0

























LH2 PREVALVES MAINSTAGE BLOCKING DIODES (6)
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBiT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART sTRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONT_INATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND i0
=
m
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-141
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















LH2 PREVALVES BLOCKING DIODE
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/_R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/I R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING
ENGINE BURN, RESULTING IN ENGINE EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.













































LH2 PREVALVE CLOSE SWITCH COMMAND A BLOCKING












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE ENGINE ISOLATION IN THE
EVENT OF AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND I0
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-143
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















LH2 PREVALVES OPEN SWITCH COMMAND C BLOCKING
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: _
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
= , ±
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING


















REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND i0
m
m



































LH2 PREVALVES OPEN SWITCH COMMAND B BLOCKING
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PVS, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING
ENGINE BURN, RESULTING IN ENGINE EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND i0
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-145
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE SWITCH B&C BLOCKING DIODES (6)
SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY : ....
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM







SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE ENGINE ISOLATION IN THE
_NT OF AN _NGINE SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND I0
mm
l




















LH2 PREVALVES OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODES (6)
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE ENGINE ISOLATION IN THE
EVENT OF AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN.























LH2 PREVALVES OPEN SWITCH SCAN DIODES (9)
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVAL_S (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILU_, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE THE ISOLATION OF AN ENGINE
WITH UNCONTAINED DAMAGE ............








































LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE SWITCH SCAN DIODES (9)
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING
ENGINE BURN, RESULTING IN ENGINE EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.







REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-149
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 PREVALVES OPEN COMMAND A RPC OUTPUT DIODES (3)
SHORT












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM .......
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FU=NC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/!R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING










































LH2 PREVALVES OPEN COMMAND A RPC OUTPUT DIODES (3)












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE PREVALVE TO CLOSE DURING
ENGINE BURN, RESULTING IN ENGINE EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
=
w
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND i0
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-151
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT DIODES
SHORT












_2 PROPELU_T F_ED SYST_
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE ENGINE ISOLATION IN THE
















_ _ _ _E _ _
VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND I0
g
u Z














LH2 PREVALVES CLOSE COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT DIODES
SHORT TO GROUND












LH2 PROPELLANT FEED SYSTEM
LH2 PREVALVES (PV4, PV5, PV6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PRECLUDE ENGINE ISOLATION IN THE
EVENT OF UNCONTAINED DAMAGE.
w
w
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 9 AND i0
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-153
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












LO2 TANK PRE-PRESS CHECK VALVE (CVI6)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /















































LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31, 33, 35)
CLOGGED ORIFICE



































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-155
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













LO2 BLEED CHECK VALVE (CV31,33,35)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE































































GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV53,54,55)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-157
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /


















































LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
FAIL TO RELIEVE





































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-159
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/21/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LO2 FEED (ORB/ET) DISCONNECT (PDI)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION

























































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
b
DATE: 1/21/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:




ITEM: LO2 FEED DISCONNECT (PDI)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF ACTUATOR













































L02 FEED DISCONNECT (PDI)
LCC DECEPTION ....




























GENERATED IN RESPONSE TO AN RI/NASA CIL.






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1/21/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT : i/1




LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB
FAIL TO REMAIN LOCKED












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT


















REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-163
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










L02 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB
FAIL TO UNLOCK POST-MECO




















































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB
FAIL TO REMAIN UNLOCKED DURING SEP OPS




































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION











































































LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB
ERRONEOUS INDICATION































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-167
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




1/21/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT : i/1




LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF ACTUATOR























































LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB
LATCH ROD FAILS TO TOGGLE




































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-169
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










LO2 AND LH2 FEED DISCONNECT LATCH ASSEMBLY (ORB
LCC DECEPTION




























EFFECTS/RATIONA_:_I! ...... "" =_ _<_i -_- _ _-
GENERATED IN RESPONSE TO AN RI/NASA CIL WORKSHEET. FAILURE MODE










































LO2 FILL AND DRAIN DISCONNECT (PDI2)
FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN






























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-171
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LO2 FILL AND DRAIN DISCONNECT (PDI2)
FAIL TO OPEN

































































LO2 FILL AND DRAIN DISCONNECT (PDI2)
FAIL TO CLOSE AT LIFTOFF































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-173
i_
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









LO2 FILL AND DRAIN DISCONNECT (PDI2)
PROBE DISENGAGEMENT FAILURE













































































LO2 PREVALVE (PVI, 2, 3)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
















REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-175
INDEPENDENT ORBITER AssESSMENT












LO2 PREVALVE (PVl, 2, 3)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF ACTUATOR


































































LO2 PREVALVE (PVl, 2, 3)
LCC DECEPTION












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /











REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-177
----:3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: _/ i
LANDING/SAFING: / _








































LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
INTERNAL ACTUATOR LEAKAGE


































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-179
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
LOSS OF POSI_O_ I_DICATIoN




























































LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION






























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-181
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:" 1/25/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:




ITEM: LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
FAILURE MODE: RELIEF VALVE FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, LEAKAGE




























































LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION
































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-183
=
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LO2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
RUPTURE/LEdGE OF ACTUATOR _































































LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION


































FAILURE OF THE INDICATOR ALONE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-185
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
FAILS TO RELIEVE





























































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET





LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVl0)
RELIEF VALVE FAILS TO RESEAT, LEAKAGE
































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-187
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET








LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION









































































LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF ACTUATOR






























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-189
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LO2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
LCC DECEPTION































































LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9)
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-191
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LO2 BLEED SHUTOFF VALVE (PVI9)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF VALVE ACTUATOR







































































ITEM: L02 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRC VALVE (PV20, 21)
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS INDICATION

















































LO2 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRC VALVE (PV20, 21)
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION
































































LH2/LO2 PROPELLANT LEVEL SENSORS
INADVERTENT OUTPUT































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-195
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LH2/L02 PROPELLANT LEVEL SENSORS
LOSS OF OUTPUT










































































LH2 DELTA-P TRANSDUCER (MT44)
RUPTURE OF DIAPHRAGM















































LO2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH 3, 4, 5)
EXCESS ANNULUS PRESSURE INCREASE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F_C
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: / _
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /




































LO2 12 INCH FEEDLINE (FH 3, 4, 5)
LOSS OF INSULATION PROPERTIES

















































GO2 PRESSURE MANIFOLD REPRESS ORIFICE (RPI)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE i



























































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-200
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LO2 BLEED LINE, 1.5" DIA
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE





























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-201
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LO2 RELIEF LINE (PV7 TO RVS)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE






































































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET





LO2 RELIEF LINE, i" DIA (RV5 TO EXIT)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE



















































LO2 RELIEF SENSE LINE, .38" DIA
RU  t RE/LEDGE











































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : I/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT :
MDAC I D: 255 ABORT :
ITEM: LO2 RELIEF SENSE LINE, .38" DIA
FAILURE MODE : RUPTURE/LEAKAGE














SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /








REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-205
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88
SUBSYSTEM: MPS







LO2 BLEED RECIRC & POGO SUPPRESSION LINE, i, 1.5,
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE





















































LO2 BLEED RECIRC & POGO SUPPRESSION LINE, I, 1.5,
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





FAILURE MODE IS ADDRESSED ON 0428-1.
DELETED.



















LO2 DELTA PRESSURE LINE, .25" DIA
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_NC
P_UNCH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: /
_DUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:





























































































ITEM: L02 FEEDLINE SCREEN
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE


































































LO2 LINE ASSEMBLY (PDI TO CV12 & RP1 TO CV10)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE





























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-21f
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: i/I
MDAC ID: 262 ABORT: /
ITEM: GO2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE, .63" DIA, CV TO
FCV
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE

































































GO2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (LV53, 54, 55 TO
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE










































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-213
m
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






GO2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (CV16 TO PD9)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE












































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER
LOSS OF OUTPUT






































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-215
L
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LO2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER
INADVERTENT OUTPUT




















































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






L02 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /








REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-217
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









GO2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
























































LO2 SENSE LINE (PDI TO PR5)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE














































LO2 ENGINE INLET PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION

































































LO2 MANIFOLD PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION




































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-221
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












GO2 DISCONNECT PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION

























































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LO2 ENGINE INLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION


































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-223
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












GO2 ENGINE OUTLET TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION












































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:







L02 FEED MANIFOLD DISCONNECT TEMPERATURE
ERRONEOUS INDICATION































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-225
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LO2/LH2 NAFLEX FLANGE FACE SEALS
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE





































































LO2/LH2 METALLIC BOSS SEALS (K SEALS)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-227
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




























































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-228
J!°
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









GO2/GH2 NAFLEX FLANGE FACE SEALS
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-229
D
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION






















































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)
RELIEF VALVE FAILS TO RESEAT, REVERSE LEAKAGE
































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-231
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:




ITEM: LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE
FAILURE MODE: RU_/LEAKAGE OF ACTUATOR












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: / -







































LH2 INBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVI2)
LCC DECEPTION


































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-233
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND D_IN VALVE (PVII)
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION


















































iREPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-234
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/27/88
_ SUBSYSTEM: MPS












LH2 OUTBOARD FILL AND DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /









REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-235
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF ACTUATOR












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT





















































LH2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVlI)
LCC DECEPTION


































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-237
i
gINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 FILL & DRAIN DISCONNECT (PD11)
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN


































































LII2 FILL & DRAIN DISCONNECT (PDII)
FAILS TO OPEN






























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-239
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LH2 FILL & DRAIN DISCONNECT (PDII)
FAILS TO CLOSE AT T-O SEP












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /



















































LH2 FILL & DRAIN DISCONNECT (PDII)
PROBE DISENGAGEMENT AT T-O








































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-241
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 HI POINT BLEED DISCONNECT (PDI7)
FAILS TO _IN 0PEN _






































































LH2 HI POINT BLEED DISCONNECT (PDI7)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /







REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-243
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: _2 _PT,_NISH VAL_ (PVI3)
FAILURE MODE: E_ONEOUS INDICATION

































































LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVI3)
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION






































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-245
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LH2 REPLENISH VALVE (PVI3) _
RUPTURE/_AKAGE OF ACTUATOR __





































































_2 HI POINT BLEED VAL_ (PV22)
E_ONEOUS INDICATION
































_PORT DATE 03/11/88 E-247
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)
FAIL TO RELIEVE







































































LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION
































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-249
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LH2 HI POINT BLEED VALVE (PV22)
FAIL TO RELIEVE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_UNCH : / RTLS : / _
LIFTOFF : / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: / _......












































LH2 SYSTEM DELTA-P TRANSDUCER (MT44)
RUPTURE OF DIAPHRAGM






























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-251
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











LEAD ANALYST: W.J. MCNICOLL
.25" DIA









































































LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE (PV22 TO PDI7)
LOSS OF INSULATING VACUUM





































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-253
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/29/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: I/I
MDAC ID: 305 ABORT: /
ITEM: LH2 HI POINT BLEED LINE (PV22 TO PDI7)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE



























































LH2 LINE ASSEMBLY (PD2 TO RV7, CVI5)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE


































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-255
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VLAVE (PD3)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION ....

































































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET








LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /












ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET





LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION





























































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/29/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
CAVITY FAILS TO RELIEVE






























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-259
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE (PD3)
RUPT_/LE_GE OF ACTUATOR































































LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE (PVI4, 15, 16)
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION































REPORT DATE 03111188 E-261
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE (PVI4, 15, 16)
NOT IDENTIFIED



































































DATE: 1/29/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:




ITEM: LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP VALVE (PVI4, 15, 16)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF ACTUATOR












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /



























LH2 RECIRCULATION PUMP (PP1, 2, 3)
LOSS OF PUMP SPEED INDICATION










































































GH2 PRESSURIZATION ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CV21,
FAILS TO CHECK





































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-265
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










GH2 PRESSURIZATION ISOLATION CHECK VALVE (CV21,
FAILS TO CLOSE, LEAKAGE






























































GH2 PRESSURIZATION FLOW CONTROL VALVE (LV56, 57,
CLOGGED FLOW PATH













































LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /







































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/01/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
FAIL TO RELIEVE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /








REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-269
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION































































LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE OF ACTUATOR





























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-271
W
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
LCC DECEPTION



























A[ ] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET











LH2 PREVALVE (PV4, 5, 6)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION
































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-273
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/01/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LH2 PREVALVE (PV4, 5, 6)
RU_/LEAKAGE OF ACTUATOR































































LH2 PREVALVE (PV4, 5, 6)
LCC DECEPTION










































ITS: _2 FEEDLINE SC_EN
FAIL_ MODE: RU_/S_UC_L FAIL_











SUBSYS L_AD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
























































































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-277
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/01/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV8)
ERRONEOUS INDidATiON


































































LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV8)
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION






























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-279
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV8)
ACTUATORLEAKAGE _ ....
































































LH2 FEEDLINE RELIEF FLAME ARRESTOR (FL1)
FAIL TO ARREST









































LH2 FEEDLINE _LIE? F_ ARRESTOR (FLI)
RU_/_GE ......












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LALrNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /



































LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)
INBD FAILS TO RELIEVE































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-283
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITE_R SU_BSYSTEM ANALYSi_S-W()RKSHEET
DATE: 2/02/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PV17)
RELIEF VALVE FAI_TO RESEAT

































































LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION


























A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-285
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 FEED RTLS INBOARD VALVE (PVI7)
LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /










































LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE (PV18)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION


































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-287
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: LH2 FEED RTLS OUTBOARD VALVE (PV18)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF POSITION INDICATION


































































LH2 RELIEF LINE (FROM PV8 TO RV6)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-289
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










LH2 RELIEF LINE (RV6 TO FLI)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE _ _































































LH2 RELIEF SENSE LINE
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE



























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-291
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET ....
DATE: 2/02/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:





LH2 RELIEF SENSE LINE
CLOGGED .......












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LI_TOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/02/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 344 ABORT: /
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (CV21 TO LV56, CV22
TO LV57, CV23 TO LV58)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE






































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






GH2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (LV56, 57, 58 TO
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE



























































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/02/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: I/i
MDAC ID: 346 ABORT: /
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (PDI0 TO CVI7)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE






























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-295
-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/02/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 347 ABORT: /
ITEM: GH2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (MANIFOLD ASSEMBLY)
FAILUREMODE: RUP_/_GE .....











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /















































GH2 PRESSURIZATION SUPPLY LINE (LV52 TO PD5)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE





























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-297
z
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LH2 SENSE LINE (PD2 TO PR6)
RUPTURE/TRAKAGE











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES

























































LH2 RTLS DUMP LINE (PD2 TO PVI7)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE





































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-299
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/02/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 351 ABORT:
ITEM: LH2 RTLS DUMP LINE (PVI7 TO PVI8)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE










































































ITEM: LH2 RTLS DUMP LINE (PV18 TO OUTLET)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE






























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-301
w_
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/02/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER
LOSS OF OUTPUT






































































LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER
INADVERTENT OUTPUT






























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-303
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












LH2 ULLAGE PRESSURE SIGNAL CONDITIONER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION
















































































LH2 INLET PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT


































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-305
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 ENGINE MANIFOLD PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION




































































GH2 OUTLET PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION
































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-307
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












GH2 DISCONNECT PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION _-






























































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/02/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:







LH2 FEED MANIFOLD DISCONNECT TEMPERATURE
ERRONEOUS INDICATION

































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-309
INDEPENDE_ ORBITER ASSESS_












_2 ENGINE INT._T TEMPERA_ _SDUCER
E_ONEOUS INDICATION





































































ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE (CVI, 2, 3)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-311
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












HELIUM SUPPLY DISCONNECT (PD8)
FAILS TO OPEN






































































ITEM: ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE
(CV25,26,36,37,41,42)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-313
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









ENGINE HELI_ PRESSURE REGULATOR (PRI,2,3,7,8,9)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED












FLIGHT P_E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAt_NCH: / RTLS : /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /





THIS IS GENERATED IN RESPONSE TO NASA FMEA/CIL 0205-3.








































ITEM: ENGINE REGULATOR OUTLET CHECK VALVE
(CV5,6,7,29,40,45)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-315
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY INTERCONNECT OUT VALVE
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED



































































ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT OUT CHECK VALVE
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE


































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-317
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ENGINE HELIUM INTERCONNECT IN CHECK VALVE
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /






REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-318
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY CHECK VALVE (CV4)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-319
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










GO2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION CHECK
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE












FLI GHT-P_HASE HDW/_C ABORT























































LO2 FEED MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION CHECK VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /









REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-321
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION CHECK
FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN











SUBSY S LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES



























































GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION CHECK
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-323
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










LH2 RECIRCULATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION CHECK
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE





























































LH2 FEED MANIFOLD NOMINAL REPRESS CHECK VALVE
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE
































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-325
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION CHECK
FAIL TO REMAIN OPEN









































































GH2 PRESSURIZATION MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION CHECK
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-327
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS REPRESSURIZATION CHECK
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE











FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /







































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
2/05/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 1/1
385 ABORT: /
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVE (LV7, 8)
RUP'Fu'RE/LEAKAGE






























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-329
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM-ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/05188 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 386 ABORT: /
ITEM: VALVE ACTUATION SOLENOIDS DOWNSTREAM OF CV9
(LV12,14,16,18,20,22,47,49,50,65,66,67,68,79,83,84,85)
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH VENT PORT































































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/05/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: i/I
MDAC ID: 387 ABORT: /
ITEM: VALVE ACTUATION SOLENOIDS DOWNSTREAM OF CV9
(LV12,14,16,18,20,22,47,49,50,65,66,67,68,79,83,84,85)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE, LEAKAGE OF VALVE BODY





































F REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-331
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/08/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 388 ABORT: /
ITEM: VALVE ACTUATION SOLENOID VALVES UPSTREAM OF CV9
(LV28,29,30 _,3I,3_'_, 34,3_6_,3_,'77__) : -.....
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE THROUGH VENT PORT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: / _
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /_
LANDING/SAFING: /



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/08/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 389 ABORT: /
ITEM: VALVE ACTUATION SOLENOID VALVES UPSTREAM OF CV9
(LV28,29,30,31,32,33,34,36,38,77,78)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE THROUGH VALVE BODY

































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-333
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION VALVES (LV42, 43)
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE


























































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/11/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:







LH2 RECIRCULATION DISCONNECT VALVE OPENING
PREMATURE ACTUATION































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-335
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LATCH LOCKING SOLENOIDS (0V65, 67)
PREMATURE DEACTUATION











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES





































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-336 m
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/11/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:











































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/11/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LATCH LOCK SOLENOID (LV65, 67)
PREMATURE DEACTUATION


















































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/11/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LATCH UNLOCK SOLENOID (LV66, 68)
FAIL TO ACTUATE































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-339
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LATCH UNLOCK SOLENOID (LV66, 68)
PREMATURE DEACTUATION

















































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/11/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LATCH UNLOCK SOLENOID (LV66, 68)
PREMATURE ACTUATION































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-341
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESSURIZATION VALVE (LV74,
RUPTURE, LEAKAGE













































































LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION REGULATOR (PRS)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL LEAKAGE





























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-343
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/28/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 401 ABORT: /
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH (3)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN, FAILS TO CLOSE, SHORTS TO GROUND
























































































































CLOSE RPC OUTPUT DIODE
SHORTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
_PRE_UNCH: / RT_ :
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAF_G: / ......._:











































CLOSE RPC OUTPUT DIODE
SHORTS TO GROUND




































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-347
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



















































































































FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) EPD&C/MPS












































































OPEN RPC OUTPUT DIODE
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT


















REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-351
q--.
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















OPEN RPC OUTPUT DIODE
SHORTS TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPD&C/MPS








































































































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-353
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









OPEN MDM BLOCKING DIODE
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS































































CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODE
SHORTS

































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-355
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















CLOSE MDM BLOCKING DIODE
SHORTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: / ,
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-356 m i
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















OPEN SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
SHORTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /






REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-357
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
SHORTS
LEAD ANALYST: R. O'DONNELL SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS

































































CLOSE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
SHORTS




















































FAILURE TO TRANSFER TO OPEN













LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RT_: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





FAILURE CAUSES THE LOSS OF THE MANUAL CAPABILITY TO OPEN THE L02
RELIEF VALVE. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN MPS OVER
PRESSURIZATION AND RUPTURE. SWITCH IS STANDBY REDUNDANT.












































ITEM: LO2 TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO XFER TO CLOSE













LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW 02 TO ESCAPE INTO THE
ATMOSPHERE CREATING A FIRE HAZARD. THE SWITCH IS STANDAY
REDUNDANT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-361
=
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIF_TOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/iR-
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/!R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LO2 RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE WILL CLOSE BECAUSE OF THIS FAILURE.
IF ALL REDUNDANCY IS LOST THE LO2 FEEDLINE MANIFOLD COULD















REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEET 19
m
l







































LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL DISABLE THE USE OFTHE FEEDLINE RELIEF ISOLATION
SWITCH. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCYCOULD PRODUCE A FIRE HAZARD.
THE SWITCH IS A STANDBY REDUNDANT SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEET 19
z_
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-363
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORB-IT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: _ P_ECEIP_T STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......................
THE FAILURE ERODES REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD_













REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEET 19
B





















BLOCKING DIODE, MDM TO RPC
SHORT













LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEET 19
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-365
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE RPC C OUTPUT, 12A
SHORT TO GROUND













L02 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: '3/I_ _
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _z_
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE, CONT_INATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ............
A LOSS OF ALL I%EDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW 02 TO BE RELEASED INTO THE
ATMOSPHERE.















































DIODE, RPC CROSSOVER, 12A
SHORT TO GROUND













LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW 02 TO BE RELEASED INTO THE
ATMOSPHERE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-367
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












RPC A OUTPUT DIODE, I_2A _ _
SHORT i_ _ _ _













LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: _/i_
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





















































RPC A OUTPUT DIODE, 12A
SHORT TO GROUND













LO2 FEEDLINE RELIEF SHUTOFF VALVE (PV7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL RESULT IN THE VENTING OF 02 INTO
THE ATMOSPHERE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEET 19
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-369
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












DIODE, OP SW BLOCK (LCA)
SHORT













LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......_:.....
FIRST FAILURE CAUSE LOSS OF BLOCKING TO CLOSE SOLENOID INHIBIT.
SECOND FAILURE - PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND WOULD APPLY POWER TO OPEN
SOLENOID. THIRD FAILURE - TERMINATION OF OUTPUT TO CLOSE.





































ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3 (CLOSE)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT













LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE POWER TO CLOSE SOLENOID. SECOND FAILURE -
PREMATURE POWER TO OPEN SOLENOID RESULTING IN OUTBOARD FILL DRAIN
VALVE OPENING. THIRD FAILURE - OPENING OF INBOARD FILL
DRAIN/VALVE CREATING FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 13
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-371
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE, LAI MDM ISOLATION
SHORTS













LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _>_
FAILURE WILL CAUSE LACK OF BLOCKING BETWEEN MDM (LAI) AND THE
OPEN SOLENOID CIRCUIT. NO REDUCTION IN REDUNDANCY AND NO ADVERSE
AFFECTS. _ _IT_ _ _!'!_ _........











































DIODE, OP SW BLOCK (MODULE)
SHORT


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FALIURE ELIMINATES BLOCKING BETWEEN OPEN SOLENOID CIRCUITRY AND




REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-373
!
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE, OPEN MDM ISOLATION
SHORTS













LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE ELIMINATES BLOCKING BETWEEN MDM (FA4) AND THE OPEN























































LO2 OUTBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PV9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. SECOND FAILURE - LOSS
OF DIODE IN OPEN SOLENOID HDC WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF POWER TO
OPEN SOLENOID' THIRD- FAIL_U_ _PI_,E_'_I_'I_u'I_J_C_SE SO_NO-ID POWER
WOULD CLOSE THE OUTBO_D FILL/D_INVALVE. IF THIS FAILURE
OCCURS DURING FAST FILL, THERE WILL BE A SUDDEN PRESSURE SPIKE IN
THE LINE CREATING POSSIBLE RUPTURE AND FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 13
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-375
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












L02 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN TOGGLE SWITCH
SHORTS TO GROUND, CLOSED CONTACT













LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: _ PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST EFFECT IS LOSS OF REDUNDANCY FOR CLOSE SOLENOID POWER.
LOSS OF EITHER MDM (FA2) BLOCKING DIODE WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF
CLOSE SOLENOID POWER. PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND WILL OPEN F/D
VALVE,


































DIODE (2), OPEN SW BLOCK (MODULE)
SHORT













LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVl0)
CRITICALITIES

















CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE THE GROUND OPEN COMMAND. SECOND
FAILURE (GROUNDING OF CLOSE COMMAND PATH) POSSIBLY BY SWITCH
FAILURE WILL PREMA_LY CLOSE THE F/D VALVE. IF THIS FAILURE
OCCURS DURING FAST FILL, THERE WiLL BE A PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE
LINES. THE WORST CASE IS THE RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE
FACILITY LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND FIRE HAZARDIN THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.
w
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 13
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-377
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE (3A), OPEN BLOCK A (LCA)
SHORT
































A [ 2 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE (OPEN sWiTcH BLOCKING DIODESH_TING) WILL
CAUSE TEH OPEN CMD A TO INHIBIT POWER TO THE CLOSE SOLENOID.
SECOND FAILURE (LOSS OF GND OPEN) WILL ELIMINATE POWER TO OPEN
SOLENOID. THIRD FAILURE (PREMATURE CLOSE COMMAND) _OULD_/LOSE
THE F/D VALVE. IF THIS FAILURE OCCURS DURING FAST FILL, THERE
WILL BE A PRESSURE__SPIKE IN THE LINES_THE WORST CASE IS THE
RUPTURE OF oRBfTER AND/OR GSEFACILITY LINES' _ T__U_TS COULD
BE AFT FUSELAGE OVERPRESSURIZATION AND FIRE HAZARD IN
THE ORBITER AND ON THE PAD.





















































DIODE (3A), OPEN SW BLOCK B (LCA)
SHORTS













L02 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION-.
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE POWER TO THE OPEN SOLENOID. PREMATURE
CLOSE COMMAND WILL CAUSE F/D VALVE TO CLOSE. IF THIS FAILURE
OCCURS DURING FAST FILL, THERE WILL BE A PRESSURE SPIKE IN THE
LINES. THE WORST CASE IS THE RUPTURE OF ORBITER AND/OR GSE
FACILITY LINES. THE RESULTS COULD BE AFT FUSELAGE
OVERPRESSURIZATION AND FIRE HAZARD IN ORBITER AND ON PATH.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 13
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-379
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












DIODE (3A), FA1 MDM BLOCK
SHORTS













LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVlO)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILt_WILL ELIMINATE............B_CKING PROTECTION BETWEEN MDM (FAI) AND
HDC TYPE 3. NO ADVERSE AFFECT.































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT:






DIODE (3A), FA4 MDM BLOCK
SHORTS













LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVl0)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE BLOCKING PROTECTION BETWEEN MDM (FA4) AND
OPEN SOLENOID CIRCUITRY. NO ADVERSE AFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 13
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-381
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE (3A), CL SW BLOCK
SHORTS













LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR _ RTLS: 3/3 _
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE'_@ART'STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .....
FIRST FAILURE ELIMINATES BLOCKING BETWEEN CLOSE COMMAND AND OPEN
SOLENOID INHIBIT. SECOND FAILURE - SWITCH FAILS, GROUNDING CLOSE
CMD AND INTERRUPTING CLOSE COMMAND POWER. THIRD FAILURE,
PREMATURE OPEN COMMAND. GAS TRAPPED IN LINE COULD CAUSE
CAVITATION OF PUMPS ON ONE OR MORE SSME's.









































DIODE (3A), FA2 MDM BLOCK
SHORTS













LO2 INBOARD FILL & DRAIN VALVE (PVI0)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE BLOCKING PROTECTION BETWEEN MDM (FA2) AND
CLOSE SOLENOID CIRCUITRY. NO ADVERSE AFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 13
=
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-383
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE, LAI MDM BLOCK
SHORTS


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE BLOCKING PROTECTION BETWEEN MDM (LAI) AND
OPEN SOLENOID CIRCUITRY. NO ADVERSE AFFECT.










































HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE i, CL
FAIL OFF













ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO L02 17 INCH DISCONNECT VALVE
NOT CLOSING. ADDITIONAL FAILURES COULD LEAD TO ORBITER/ET
COLLISION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
=
i,i
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-385
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 1, OP
FAIL OFF











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
02
ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE iPDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/iR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY_SCREENS: A _:[2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT PATH TO OPEN SOLENOID. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
COULD _$ULT IN VALVE CLOSURE WHILE SSME'S ARE RUNNING CAUSING


















REFE_NCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 15
: =
I






















ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3, CL
FAIL--MODE: _SS OF OUTPUT













ET/ORBITER FEED DISCO_ECT V_ (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAILU_, CONT_INATION, _CH
SHOCK, VIB_TION, THE_L SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
_SS OF ALL _D_D_CY COULD t_AD TO L02 17 INCH DISCO_ECT VAL_
NOT C_SING. ADDITIONAL FAIL_S COULD _AD TO ORBITER/ET
COLLISION _D _SS OF _HICL_.
_FE_NCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 15
!
1

















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3, CL
LOSS OF OUTPUT : _ _: .... :











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
02
ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ON0_T: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 :_
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSESI_gIECE-PARTSTRUC_L FAILURE, CO_AMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK _; ;_;_ _ _;
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
LOSS OF ALL=_DUNDANCY COULD LEAD TO L02 17 INCH DISCONNECT VALVE
NOT CLOSING. ADDITIONAL FAILURES COULD LEAD TO ORBITER/ET
















































DIODE (12A), CL RPC "B" OUT
SHORT













ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF REDUNDANT BLOCKING PROTECTION.
SECOND FAILURE (SERIES RPC BLOCKING DIODE SHORTS) RESULTING IN
PARALLEL RPC HAVING ITS OUTPUT TIED TO GROUND. CURRENT LIMIT
WILL TRIP ELIMINATING POWER TO CLOSE SOLENOID. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN VALVE CLOSURE WHILE SSME'S ARE RUNNING
CAUSING POSSIBLE MPS RUPTURE AND FIRE.
REFERENCES". VS72-941102 SHEET 15
w
=
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-389
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE (12A), CL RPC "B" OUT
SHORT TO GROUND













ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _ _
P-TERMINAL OF DIODE WOULD SHORT TO GROUND. THIS WOULD ELIMINATE
A REDUNDANT PATH FOR OPEN SOLENOID POWER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
COULD RESULT IN VALVE CLOSURE WHILE SSME'S ARE RUNNING CAUSING
POSSIBLE MPS RUPTURE AND FIRE .......














































DIODE (12A), CL XOVER
SHORT













ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF REDUNDANCY AGAINST APPLYING CLOSE SOLENOID
POWER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN VALVE CLOSURE
WHILE SSME'S ARE RUNNING CAUSING POSSIBLE MPS RUPTURE AND FIRE.
REFERENCES: RI DRAWING VS72-941102 SHEET 15
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-391
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE (12A), CL XOVER
SHORT TO GROUND












LH2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT VALVE (PD2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: i/i TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: 3/2 AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/I
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES_ _ P_E_2_ART _STRUC_L _FAILURE, _CONTAMINATION, MEeH _
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
FAILURE WILL CAUSE LOSS OF POWER TO THE CLOSE SOLENOID. FAILURE
TO CLOSE VALVE DURING ETSEPARATION COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE.




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/20/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 450 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR OP POS SW MONITOR
OPEN













ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
LOSS OF MONITORING REDUNDANCY
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 15
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-393
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT















_SISTOR CL POS SW MONITOR
OPENS













ET/O_ITER FEED DISCO_E_ VAL_ (PD1)
_ITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
CAusEs: P_ECEIP_T"STRUC_L FAIL_E,_NT_INATION, _CH
SHOCK, VIB_TION, _E_L SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
_SS OF MONITORING _D_D_CY



































ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3, OP
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE OPEN SOLENOID.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN VALVE CLOSURE WHILE SSME'S
ARE RUNNING CAUSING POSSIBLE MPS RUPTURE AND FIRE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 15
L
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-395
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE 3, OP
LOSS OF OUTPUT






























SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........
FAILURE C_SES LOSSO-F REDU}_DANT POWER PATH TO THE OPEN SOLENOID.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN VALVE CLOSURE WHILE SSME'S














































DIODE CL RPC "C" OUT (12A)
SHORT













ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PD1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE BLOCKING PROTECTION TO RPC "C". A SECOND
FAILURE (RPC SHORT TO GROUND) WILL ELIMIANTE CLOSE SOLENOID
POWER. LOSS OF ALL REDUND_CY COULD LEAD TO L02 17 INCH
DISCONNECT VALVE NOT CLOSING. ADDITIONAL FAILURES COULD LEAD TO
ORBITER/ET COLLISION AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 15
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-397
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












DIODE CL RPC "C" OUT (12A)
SHORT TO GROUND













ET/ORBITER FEED DISCONNECT VALVE (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PItRTST_CTURAL FAILURE,_TAMINATION, MECH
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO CLOSE SOLENOID.
SECOND FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE CLOSE SOLENOID POWER. THIRD
FAILURE_0LD_6PE-_VALVE._TH_AiL_E COULD LEAD TO ORBITER/ET
COLLISION_D LOSS OF VEHICLE.

















































ITEM: HDC I-GND C/O CMD PWR
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT














GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (I PER SSME)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEET 39
L
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-399
URING
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















HDC I-GND C/O CMD PWR
INADVERTENT OUTPUT














GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (i PER SSME) (LV53, LV54, &
........tRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC _ABDRT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/iR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/iR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE ARMS THE GROUND CHECKOUT SYSTEM. A PREMATURE
ALL C/O LOW SIGNAL COULD THEN CLOSE ALL FLOW CONTROL VALVES


































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILING OPEN HAS NO EFFECT• A SHORT WOULD CAUSE A LOSS IN
REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE OPENING. A SECOND FAILURE (SHORT OF
INTERNAL HDC DIODE) WILL GROUND THE OUTPUT OF THE HDC AND OPEN
THE VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL OVERPRESSURIZE THE ET.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 25
w
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-401
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: OPENS AND SHORTS





























B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION'.
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE_WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON _REW OR VEHICLE.




















































HDC I-RELAY CONTROL PWR
LOSS OF OUTPUT














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 2/IR RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF : 2/IR TAL : I/1
ONORBIT : 3/3 AOA : I/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
THE FAILURE WILL OPEN ONE FLOW CONTROL VALVE PREMATURELY. A
SECOND FAILURE COULD OVERPRESSURIZE THE ET. FIRST FALIURE DURING
ABORTS CAN CREATE SUCH A HAZARD.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 25
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-403
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















HDC I-RELAY CONTROL PWR
INADVERTENT OUTPUT













LH2 TANK PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
GH2 PREssUR_E FLOW CONTROL _LVE (1 PER SSME) (LV53, LV54, &
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 - RTLS: 3fir
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ....
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE'PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONA=LE_
THE FIRST FAILURE CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. FAILURE OF A
PRESSURE TRANSDUCER WOULD CAUSE A SWITCH TO THE STANDBY
TRANSDUCER. A THIRD FAILURE COULD CAUSE AN OPENING OF TWO FLOW
CONTROL VALVES AND ET OVERPRESSURIZATION.

























































GO2 PRESSURE FLOW CONTROL VALVE (I PER SSME) (LV53, LV54, &
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B [ P ] C [ P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL OPEN ONE FLOW CONTROL VALVE PREMATURELY. A
SECOND FAILURE COULD OVERPRESSURIZE THE ET. FIRST FAILURE DURING
ABORTS CAN CREATE SUCH A HAZARD.
i
I
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 25
m
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-405
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/!R
O_0_iT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FAILURE WOULD CLOSE ONE SOLENOID. A SECOND FAILURE COULD
CLOSE A SECOND VALVE. LOW ULLAGE PRESSURE COULD CAUSE IMPLOSION
DUE TO FLIGHT LOADS.



















































L02 POGO ACCUMULATOR RECIRCULATION VALVE (2) (PV20, PV21)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL OPEN A L02 POGO ACCUMVALVE.
LAUNCH DELAY, BUT WILL NOT CREATE A HAZARD.
THIS WILL CAUSE A
REFERENCES". VS72-941102 SHEET 12
m
k REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-407
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 ....
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT- A SECOND FAILURE COULD
CLOSE THE LO20VBD B_FALVEDUR_ING P_CH ACTIVITIES. THIS
















REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 12
-- i










































LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PV19)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. A SECOND FAILURE COULD
CLOSE THE LO20VBD BLEED VALVE DURING PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES. THIS
COULD CAUSE A GEYSER EFFECT CREATING A FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD
ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 12
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-409
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (P_i@) _
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT:..... 3/3 ATO: _3/3_
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE2P_TSTRUC__FAILURE, CONTAMINATIOn, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. A SECOND FAILURE COULD











COULD CAUSE A GEYSER EFFECT CREATING A FIREAND EXP]X)SION HAZARD
ON THE PAD.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 12
m |
u
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-410
Iw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























L02 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT. A SECOND FAILURE COULD
CLOSE THE LO20VBD BLEED VALVE DURING PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES. THIS
COULD CAUSE A GEYSER EFFECT CREATING A FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD
ON THE PAD.
w
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 12
m
i
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-411
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : PIECE'PART STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
,.,,,.,..,,,,_._.,.,.,.,_..__FEC_/_T_T.__ _ ......._ _










CLOSE THE LO20VBD BLEED VALVE DURING PRELAUNCH ACTIVITIES. THIS
COULD dAUSE A GEYSER _FFEcT _CREATI--NG A_ Fi_ AND _EXPLOSI_ _Z_D
ON THE PAD.































CL RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT TO GROUND













LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 1/1 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE BOTH POWER PATHS TO THE SOLENOID AND
OPEN THE VALVE. THIS FAILURE DURING PRELAUNCH COULD CAUSE A LO2
SPILL ON THE LAUNCH PAD. SINCE THE LO2 BLEED DISCONNECT VALVE IS
NOT CERTIFIED TO CLOSE UNDER FLOW. A FIRE HAZARD
IS CREATED.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 12
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-413
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT






























LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PV19)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE= ...... _i_ _ _-
THE FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE A REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE CLOSE
SOLENOID. A SECOND FAILURE AT LAUNCH COULD VENT LO2 DURING
UMBiLIC_L_IION_ .........._F_'__CURS AFTER_LiFTOFF THEN THE
BLEED DISCONNE_T_VALVE WILL PR_VIq)EADDED REDUNDANCY.



































CL RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT TO GROUND













L02 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE A REDUNDANT POWER PATH TO THE CLOSE
SOLENOID. A SECOND FAILURE AT LAUNCH COULD VENT LO2 DURING
UMBILICAL SEPARATION. IF FAILURE OCCURS AFTER LIFTOFF THEN THE
BLEED DISCONNECT VALVE WILL PROVIDE ADDED REDUNDANCY.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 12
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-415
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















POS SW MONITOR RESISTOR
OPEN













LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PVI9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC .... ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI_0FF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.



























































LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME




DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-417
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/iR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ...........
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ...........
CAUSES: P_ STRUCTURAL FAILURE,- CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE|I _ ...... !_: _ _-_ :_
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE POWER TO THE
LOCK SOLENOID. A LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL


















DRAWING PPD41T1 MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-











































LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE UNLOCK SOLENOID.
LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE





DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-





































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 371R _
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IRI
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE'PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE POWER TO THE
UNLOCK SOLENOID. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW _PPER_
_S_ D__S_ BURN. _THIS WOULD _RESULT _ UN_ONTA_NED
ENGINE DAMAGE AND EXPLOSION.
_ _i_zi_ii _i_ _
REFERENCES:
87.


























































LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULDALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME




DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-421 J
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT




















































A [ 2 ] B[ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES : PIECE--PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/_IONALE _ _






















LOCK ,.SO___NO_D.._ _ A LOSS .QFALL E_CTI___ICAL AND MEC_IC. A L !_ !
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE O_]_-i_T_TET I_I_FA_ DURZNG SEPARATION.
REFERENCES :
87.






























ITEM: UNLOCK HDC I
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT













LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE UNLOCK SOLENOID.
LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL ANDMECHANICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE




DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-423
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT



























LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE ....HDW/_C .........A-B4DRT HDW/_C
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/iR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONALE: ........._<....
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE POWER TO THE
UNLOCK SOLENOID. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER
CLOS_%E D_I_G_Ss_B-t_. _ _S WOULD_RES_LT IN UNCONTAINED _













































LOCK HDC III (2)
LOSS OF OUTPUT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME




DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-425
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















LOCK HDC III (2)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE POWER TO THE
LOCK SOLENOID. A LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL
REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DURING SEPARATION.
REFERENCES :
87.




























ITEM: UNLOCK HDC III (2)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT













LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
C-RITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/iR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE UNLOCK SOLENOID.
LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE




DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
b

















UNLOCK HDC III (2)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT













LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC_
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI_IT_I_F: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR





A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
i
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANCY AGAINST PREMATURE POWER TO THE
UNLOCK S_OID. A _S_-OF--ALL _LED_--cY_ULD-ALLOW F_PPER
CLOSURE DURING SSME BURN. THIS WOULD RESULT IN UNCONTAINED


















REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
87.
m





















LOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
OPEN













LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME




DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPD_ FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-429
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















LOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT













LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD1)
cRITIcALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/iR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK -
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz _- _
THE FAILURE]qII_ ERODE BLOCKING _D_/cY _N THE LOCK SO_0ID
CIRCUIT. A I43SS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE -
















DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
w
n





















LOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT TO GROUND













LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME




DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-431
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















UNLOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
OPEN











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
O2
L02 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT _TCH (PDIi _
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
_ CAUSE_ _ P_P_T __ue_L-_AIL_ ,_ eONTAMI_AT_0N, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/-RATTONALE: _ ...... - .......
THE FAILUREWIL_-ERODEREDUNDANT POWER TO THEUNLOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
0RB ITER/ET- RECON T_ACT DU R_I_-G_=S_ARAT ION.



































ITEM: UNLOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORT













LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE BLOCKING REDUNDANCY IN THE UNLOCK SOLENOID
CIRCUIT. A LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY
COULD CAUSE ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DURING SEPARATION.
REFERENCES"
87.
DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
m
qm_
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-433
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















UNLOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT TO GROUND

































A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RA_ TIONALE: .-_ i_:_ ___ ........ _ _ ....__
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE _CK SO_NQID. A
LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE








































LOCK RPC XOVER DIODE
OPEN













LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER IN THE LOCK SOLENOID
CIRCUIT. A LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE




DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-435
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















LOCK RPC XOVER DIODE
SHORT













LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: _/I_--
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION,
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATiONALE_ .................................. _ -
THE FAILUP_-ERODES BLOCKING RED_CY_N THE OPE_ SO_OID
CIRCUIT. A LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE
DURING SSME BURN. THIS WOULD RESULT IN UNCONTAINED ENGINE DAMAGE
AND EXPLOSION. "








































LOCK RPC XOVER DIODE
SHORT TO GROUND













LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE POWER TO THE OPEN SOLENOID. A LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME BURN.




DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
u_
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-437
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















_CK RPC XO_R DIODE
SHORT











SUBSYS _D: W.J. M_ICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
02
_2 FEEDLINE DISCO_ _TCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAIL_, CONT_INATION, MEC_ICAL
SHOCK, VIB_TION, THE_L SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONAL : ......
THE FAIL_ WILL ERODE RBDUND_T PO_R TO THE _CK SOLF.NoID. A
_SS OF ALL E_CTRICAL_D MEC_ICAL _D_D_CY COU_ CAUSE







































ITEM: UNLOCK RPC XOVER DIODE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN













L02 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION •
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE BLOCKING REDUNDANCY IN THE UNLOCK SOLENOID
CIRCUIT. A LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY
COULD CAUSE ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DURING SEPARATION.
REFERENCES:
87.




REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-439
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















UNLOCK RPC XO_R DIODE
SHORT TO GROUND











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
02 .....
LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDWfFUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/iR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART _BER: _
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS_: ......_---_ _ _ ..................._ ..........
THE FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE POWER TO THE UNLOCK SOLENOID. A LOSS
OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE














































TRANSIENT SUPPRESSOR DIODES (2)
ALL













LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE OF THE DIODE PLUS THE FAILURE OF AN INTERNAL HDC
DIODE WILL GROUND A SOLENOID. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
87.
DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-441
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: UNLOCK POS SW MONITOR RESISTORS (2)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
02
LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
0NORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3 ......
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
__CAUSESI:__':_- _ PI PART STRUCTURAL_ FAILURE
, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..... _< ...._
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.










































LOCK POS SW MON RESISTOR (2)
OPEN













LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
87.
DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-443
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RPC AND SOL PWR MON RESISTORS (6)
OPEN































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
cAuSEs: _' PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE' CONTAMINATION' MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
87.












































LOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
OPEN













L02 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME





DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
u
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-445
INDEPENDENTO_ITER ASSESS_NT















_CK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT













_2 DISCO_E_ _TCH (PD1)
CRITICALITIES














c [ P ]
CAUSES : PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAIL_, CONT_INATION, _C_ICAL
SHOCK, VIB_TION, THE_L SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._ :
THE FAIL_ ERODES B_CKING PROTECTION IN THE _CK SOLENOID
CIR_IT. A _SS OF ALL _D_D_CY COULD AL_W F_PPER C_S_E

















































LOCK RPC B OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT TO GROUND













LO2 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME




DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-447
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
OPEN













L02 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR





A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/ T ONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE _6K SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE













REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
87.





















UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
SHORT













L02 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PD1)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE BLOCKING REDUNDANCY IN THE UNLOCK SOLENOID
CIRCUIT. A LOSS OF ALL ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL REDUNDANCY
COULD CAUSE ORBITER/ET RECONTACT DURING SEPARATION.
REFERENCES:
87.
DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
l
i
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-449
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: UNLOCK RPC C OUTPUT DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO GROUND












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI_OFF: 3/IR _ TAL: ...... 37iR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE'PART STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
shocK, VIB_Ti_N, THE_L-SHOCK
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE LOCK SOLENOID. A
LOSS OF ALL-REDUNDANCY COULD ALLOW FLAPPER CLOSURE DURING SSME
















REFERENCES" DRAWING PPD41Ti MPs/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
87.
































SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
02
L02 FEEDLINE DISCONNECT LATCH (PDI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





DRAWING PPD41TI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-451
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















FAIL TO XFER TO OFF (A_ _LES)
_D ANALYST: B. S_UGHTER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPDC/MPS








SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LI_OFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/5 _
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_DANCY SC_ENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH TRANSFER TO OFF IS DONE AFTER THE OMS BURN AS PART OF THE


















































LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF TWO POWER SUPPLIES WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF AN
ENGINE. CRITICALITY IS 2/IR FOR THE ABORT CASE SINCE ONE ENGINE
IS ALREADY ASSUMED TO HAVE FAILED.
REFERENCES:
87.
DRAWING PPD41CD2 MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-453
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/15/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 603 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO XFER TO OFF, PHASE A AND/OR PHASE B POLE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EPDC/MPS








SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH TRANSFER TO OFF IS DONE AFTER THE OMS BURN AS PARTOF THE



















































LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE"
THE FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
87.
DRAWING PPD41CD2 MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-













FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/_TiONAI_:
THE FAILURE WILL ERODE REDUNDANT POWER TO THE _S_E CONTROLLERS.
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD SHUTDOWN ALL SSME'S.
REFERENCES:
87.























































LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
87.
DRAWING PPD41CD2 MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
=
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-457
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPDC/MPS








SUBSYS !_A_D; W,J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DE ORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
87.







































PREM XFER TO INHIBIT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1 ) EPDC/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL INHIBIT THE SHUTDOWN OF A REDLINE ENGINE. AN
ENGINE FAILURE COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION. NA FOR THE ABORT
CASE SINCE WE ASSUME THAT AN ENGINE IS ALREADY OUT AND THE
INHIBIT SWITCH HA_ALREAD¥ TRA/_SPERRED TO INHIBIT.
REFERENCES:
87.
DRAWING PPD41CEI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-459
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1 ) EPDC/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS"'mIONALE:/,u_ _..... -
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT DURING A NOMINAL FLIGHT SINCE ALL SSME'S WILL
BE RUNNING AND THE INHIBIT WILL A_D[BE ENABLE%BYTHE GPC_
FAILURE DURING AN ABORT COULD RESULT IN A SECOND ENGINE SHUTDOWN
AFTER IT EXCEEDS THE REDLINE.
REFERENCES:
87.



































FAIL TO XFER TO INHIBIT














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT DURING A NOMINAL FLIGHT SINCE
THERE IS NO NEED TO INHIBIT EXCEPT DURING AN ABORT. FAILURE





DRAWING PPD41CEI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-461
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO XFER TO ENABLE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPDC/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT DURING A NOMINAL FLIGHT SINCE THE
SWITCH IS NEVER USED_ PQS$_B_LQ$S OF C_W AND VEH!CLE_DUI_ING








































LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT DURING A NOMINAL FLIGHT SINCE THE
SWITCH IS NEVER USED. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE DURING




DRAWING PPD41CEI MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-463
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFT6F_F: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ....
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART _STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONA_Z ......... _ii_ _......-- _.............
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EF_FEC--TON A NOMINAL F£IGHT_sINCE!T_E !_
SWITCH IS NEVER USED. FAILURE DURING AN ABORT COULD RESULT IN





























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] S [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON A NOMINAL FLIGHT SINCE THE
SWITCH IS NEVER USED. FAILURE DURING AN ABORT COULD RESULT IN




DRAWING PPD41CE2 MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-465
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPDC/MPS








SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHAS E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : i/I
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ii_i_ _ _'i_ _ _ _ _ _i
THE FAILURE WILL SHUTDOWN ONE SSME. THE FAILURE OF ANOTHER SSME
SHUTDOWN SWITCH WILL CAUSE THE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41CE2 MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-








































ITEM: ALL ECO SIM OPEN CMD HDC
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPDC/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099, SHT. 33-37.
m
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-467
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















ALL ECO SIM OPEN CMD HDC
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPDC/MPS









FLIGHT PH_E HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R





A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...............................
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD GIVE A FALSE WET INDICATION WHEN
ENGINE SHUTDOWN IS REQUIRED. THIS COULD RESULT IN STARVATION
CUTOFF AND LOSS OF VEHICLE.



































ITEM: ALL ECO SIM DRY CMD HDC
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPDC/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099, SHT. 33-37.
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-469
INDEPENDENT ORBITER _SESS_NT












ALL ECO SIM DRY _HDC
INAD_RTENT OUTPUT
_AD _ALYST: B. S_UGHTER SUBSYS _AD: W.J. MCNICOLL
B__ HIE_CHY:
i) EPDC/MPS





















B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIEcE-P_T STRUC_L_AILU_, CONT_INATION, _C_ICAL
SHOCK, VIB_TION, THE_L SHOCK.
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
A _SS oF ALL _D_D_CY COULD GI_ A FA_E DRY INDICATION _D






















_PORT DATE 03/11/88 E-470 1
m
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















ECO SIM WET CMD I-4 HDC
LOSS OF OUTPUT












LEVEL SENSOR CHECKOUT CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099, SHT. 33-37.
w
u
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-471
INDEPENDENTORBITER _SESS_















ECO SIM _T _D 1-4 HDC
INAD_RTENT OUTPUT _ ....












_L SENSOR C_CKOUT CIR_IT
_ITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C A_RT HDW/_NC
PRE_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_DANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RAT 0NA  
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD GIVE A FALSE DRY INDICATION AND
CAUSE PREMATURE ENGINE SHUTDOWN.

















































LVL SENSOR SIM OPEN CMD HDC
LOSS OF OUTPUT












LEVEL SENSOR CHECKOUT CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099, SHT. 33-37.
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-473
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















LVL SENSOR SIM OPEN CMDHDC
INADVERTENT OUTPUT

























c [ P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK.
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: , _ _ :
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN PROPEL_T UNDERLOAD.









































LVL SENSOR SIM DRY CMD HDC
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS


























THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEETS 33-37














LVL SENSOR SIM DRY CMD HDC
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS:












A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONAlS ........
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN OVERFILL AND A PROPELLANT








































LVL SENSOR SIM WET CMD HDC
LOSS OF OUTPUT












LEVEL SENSOR CHECKOUT CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEETS 33-37
L
W
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-477
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















LVL SENSOR SIM WET CMD HDC
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1 ) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN OVERFILL AND A PROPELLANT
SPILL. THIS WOULD CREATE A FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD.









































BUS 2 AND 3 UPSTREAM HDC
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF TWO POWER SUPPLIES WILL PREVENT THE CONTROL OF ULLAGE
PRESSURE. LOSS OF CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEETS 33-37
w
w














BUS 2 AND 3 UPSTREAM HDC
INADVERTENT OUTPUT

































A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MEC_ICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.













































BUS 2 AND 3 DOWNSTREAM AND BUS 1 HDC
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 21R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF TWO POWER SUPPLIES WILL PREVENT THE CONTROL OF ULLAGE
PRESSURE. LOSS OF CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION COULD RESULT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEETS 33-37















BUS 2 AND 3 DOWNSTREAM AND BUS 1 HDC












SIGNAL CONDITIONER POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RA iONA  
THE FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, MISSION.
















































LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS



















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE A LOSS IN CONTROL OVER
ULLAGE PRESSURE OR AN UNDERLOAD OF PROPELLANT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEETS 33, 34, 37
w
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-483
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT


















LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
















































LEAD ANALYST: Bo SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE A LOSS IN CONTROL OVER
ULLAGE PRESSURE OR ANUNDERLOAD OF PROPELLANT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEETS 33, 34, 37
r_
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-485
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS




















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE A LOSS IN CONTROL OVER
ULLAGE PRESSURE OR AN UNDERLOAD OF PROPELLANT.























































LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/iR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE A LOSS IN CONTROL OVER
ULLAGE PRESSURE OR AN UNDERLOAD OF PROPELLANT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEETS 33, 34, 37
--=
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-487
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DLING/SAFiN_: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIEcE-PART STRuC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RAT!ONA_ : _ __i _




















































LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ........
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEETS 33, 34, 37



















LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1 ) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR





A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL ELIMINATE FASCOS MONITORING.
VIBRATION IN EXCESS OF 12G WILL NOT BE DETECTED. THIS COULD










DRAWING PPD41DG MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
87.
DRAWING PPD41DG MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
k
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-491
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1 ) EPD&C/MPS


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL_UNDANCY Wi_ ELIMINATE FASCOS MONITORING_ _
VIBRATION IN EXCESS OF 12G WILL NOT BE DETECTED. THIS COULD











DRAWING PPD41DG MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
I





















LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
FAILURE HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
87.
DRAWING PPD41DG MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-493
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: -_
FAILURE HAS NO HARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
87.




















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL ELIMINATE FASCOS MONITORING.
VIBRATION IN EXCESS OF 12G WILL NOT BE DETECTED. THIS COULD




DRAWING PPD41DG MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT'DATE 03/11/88 E-495
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/16/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 661 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: RPC OUTPUT DIDE
FAILURE MODE: SHORT












FLIGHT PHASE _ HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE_CH: 313 _ RTLS: 31_ _=_
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 371R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LKNDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAusES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
THE FAILURE ELIMINATES BLOCKING REDUNDANCY AGAINST AN RPC SHORT
TO GROUND. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL ELIMINATE FASCOS
MONITORING. VIBRATION IN EXCESS OF 12G WILL NOT BE DETECTED.























DRAWING PPD4!DG MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17- m
i
m




























LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL ELIMINATE FASCOS MONITORING.
VIBRATION IN EXCESS OF 12G WILL NOT BE DETECTED. THIS COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
87.
DRAWING PPD41DG MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-



















LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: WoJ. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:













































BACKUP LH2 VLV SWITCH FUSE
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONLY AVAIL REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEWSUMMARY 8-17-87. THE LH2
PROPELLANT DUMP IS CONTROLLED BY THE GPC. THREE FAILURES ARE
REQUIRED TO OVERPRESSURIZE THE MANIFOLD.
REFERENCES:
87.
DRAWING PPD41AR MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-














DUMP SEQUENCE SWITCH $1
FAIL TO XFER TO STOP
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE'PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:





















DRAWING PPD41AR MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
g



























DUMP SEQUENCE SWITCH S1
PREMATURE XFER TO STOP
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





DRAWING PPD41AR MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-501
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















BACKUP LH2 VALVE SWITCH $2
FAIL TO XFER TO OPENk_LII
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECe'PART STRUC_L_FAILURE; CONT_iNATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LH2 PROPELLANT DUMP IS CONTROLALED BY THE GPC. THREE
FAILURES ARE REQUIRED TO OVERPRESSURIZE THE MANIFOLD.
REFERENCES:
87.










































BACKUP LH2 VALVE SWITCH $2
FAIL TO XFER TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





DRAWING PPD41AR MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-503
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















BACKUP LH2 VALVE SWITCH $2 ....
PREMATURE XFER TD=OP_N _ i
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) EPD&C/MPS








SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: I/I _
LIFTOFF: I/i TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
A PREMATURE DUMP WOULD VENT PROPELLANT OVERBOARD DURING BOOST.
THIS COULD RESULT IN FIRE/EXPLOSION. DOCUMENTATION ON ANY














































BACKUP LH2 VALVE SWITCH $2
PREMATURE XFER TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:





DRAWING PPD41AR MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
w













FAILURE MODE: OPEN ....












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: ' 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3





A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIB_TioN-, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION
































































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW, VEHICLE, OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-941099 SHEET 46
h
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-507
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT

















LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1 ) EPD&C/MPS









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE_AUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3 _'
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
=
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
_ _ _ .... _E_P_RT_STR_ T0_L _FAILURE _C__TION,CAUSES: PI C MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
THE FAiL_ PROVIDES THE CREWWITH FA_E DATA. AVAILABILITY OF
CONTINGENCYOR OFF-_OMINAL CREWPROCED_S ARE NOT CONSIDEREDIN
ASSIGNING CRITICALITY.
k























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-508
mw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: METER M1 (PC)
FAILURE MODE: INACCURATE OUTPUT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE PROVIDES THE CREW WITH FALSE DATA. AVAILABILITY OF




DRAWING PPD41AN MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
w
L
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-509
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: METER M2 (LO2/LH2 MANF. PRESSURE)
FAILURE MODE: INACCURATE READING












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION-.
PART NUMBER:
...._ _:_:_ _:_ ......_i_ _ _ _i ....._ _ .... MECHANICALCAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION,
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
THE FAILURE PROVIDES THE CREW WITH FALSE DATA. AVAILABILITY OF











































ITEM: METER M4 (HELIUM PRESSURE)
FAILURE MODE: INACCURATE READING












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE PROVIDES THE CREW WITH FALSE DATA. AVAILABILITY OF




DRAWING PPD41AN MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8-17-
L
L
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-511
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












TOGGLE SWITCH (TANK/_G SELECT FOR METER M4)
ALL _!












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL?AILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
THE FAILURE CAUSES A LOSS OF MONITORING CAPABILITY. AVAILABILITY
OF CONTINGENCY OR OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES ARE NOT CONSIDERED
























REFERENCES: DRAWING PPD41AN MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW S_Y8-17"
87.


















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/01/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 801 ABORT: 2/IR
LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES REMOTE POWER
CONTROLLERS (4)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT













LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES (LV74, LV75)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON A NOMINAL FLIGHT. FAILURE TO PURGE
HYDROGEN DURING AN RTLS COULD CAUSE A FIRE HAZARD.
W
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHEET 20.1
-- o
w
REPORT, DATE 03/11/88 E-513
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES RPC A OUTPUT
SHORT TO GROUND













LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES (LV74, LV75)
CRITICALITIES











RED_DANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ] z
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON A NOMINAL FLIGHT. FAILURE TO PURGE

















REFERENCES". VS72-941102, SHEET 20.1
m
m















LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES HYBRID DRIVER
LOSS OF OUTPUT













LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES (LV74, LV75)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON A NOMINAL FLIGHT. FAILURE TO PURGE
HYDROGEN DURING AN RTLS WILL CAUSE A FIRE HAZARD.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHEET 20._
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-515
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES RPC C OUTPUT
SHORT TO GROUND













LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES (LV74, LV75)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAtINCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ] .....
LOCATION •
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON A NOMINAL FLIGHT. FAILURE TO PURGE







































ITEM: LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES RPC C
CROSSOVER DIODES (2)
FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO GROUND













LH2 FEED MANIFOLD RTLS PRESS VALVES (LV74, LV75)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL CLOSE A LH2 RTLS REPRESS VALVE. FAILURE
HAS NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON A NOMINAL FLIGHT. FAILURE TO PURGE
HYDROGEN DURING AN RTLS WILL CAUSE A FIRE HAZARD. ....
REFERENCES: VS72-941102, SHEET 20.1
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-517
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















HELIUM SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVES HYBRID DRIVER
LOSS OF OUTPUT












PNEUMATIC HELIUM SYSTEM ...........
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY BLOWDOWN VALVES (LV26, LV27)
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON A NOMINAL FLIGHT. FAILURE IS CRITICALITY
1/!._pURINGoA_QRT SINCE FAILU_ TO PURGE THE AFT COMPARTMENT IS A
FIRE HAZARD.
_
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEET 20



















HELIUM ISOLATION B VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
PREM XFER TO CLOSE













HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION "B" VALVES (LV2, 4, 6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ERODES REDUNDANCY AGAINST A CUT-OFF OF HELIUM TO A
SSME. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO
LACK OF HELIUM PURGE OF THE HIGH PRESSURE OXIDIZER INTERMEDIATE
SEAL CAVITY.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 17, 18, 19
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-519
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT









HELI_ ISO_TION "B" VAL_ SWITCH B_CKING DIODE _
SHORT _ ....













_LIUM SUPPLY ISO_TION "B" VALES (LV2, 4, 6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIG_ P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
_DiNG/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAIL_, CONT_INATION, MEC_ICAL
SHOCK, VIB_TION, THE_L SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._--
THE FAIL_ ERODES _D_D_CY BE_EN OPEN SOT._.NOID PO_R PATHS.
THE OPEN CONTACTS OF THE SWITCH SUBSEQUENTLY SHORTING TO GROUND
WOULD ELIMINATE A _WER PATH. A _SS OF ALL _D_D_CY COULD











































HELIUM ISOLATION "B" VALVE RPC OUTPUT DIODE (6)
SHORT TO GROUND













HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION "B" VALVES (LV2, 4, 6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK
OF HELIUM PURGE IN A SSME.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 17, 18, 19














HELIUM ISOLATION "A" VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
PREM XFER TO CLOSE •













HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION VALVES "A" (LV2, 4, 6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P] .....
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ONLY AVAILABLE REF: MPS/EPDC FMEA REVIEW SUMMARY 8/17/87. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK OF








































HELIUM ISOLATION "A" VALVE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
SHORT













HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION "A" VALVES (LVI, 3, 5)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC AORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE BLOCKING PROTECTION. A CONTACT
TO CONTACT SHORT IN THE SWITCH WILL ELIMINATE OPEN SOLENOID
POWER. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDAI_CY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE
TO LACK OF HELIUM P_GE IN A SSME.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 17, 18, 19
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-523
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER sUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSH_ET _:
DATE: 2/02/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/iR
MDAC ID: 812 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HELIUM ISOLATION "A" VALVE SWITCH BLOCKING DIODE
FAILURE MODE: SHORT













HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION "A_ VALVES (LVI, 3, 5)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE .... HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: _/[R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE'PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL ELIMINATE BLOCKING PROTECTION. A CONTACT
TO CONTACT SHORT IN THE SWITCH WILL ELIMINATE OPEN SOLENOID
POWER. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN EXPLOSION DUE
TO LACK OF HELIUM PURGE IN A SSME.






































HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION
ALL













HELIUM SUPPLY ISOLATION "A" VALVES (LVI, 3, 5)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF THE DIODE FAILS OPEN THERE IS NO EFFECT. IF THE DIODE SHORTS
THEN THE OUTPUT WOULD BE GROUNDED WITH THE FAILURE OF AN INTERNAL
DIODE IN THE HDC. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN AN
EXPLOSION DUE TO LACK OF HELIUM PURGE IN A SSME.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 17, 18, 19
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-525
m
INDEPENDEN T ORBITER ASSESSMENT























SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY
PNEUMATIC HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE, REG PNL 4 (LVT, LVS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
THE FAILURE CAUSE THE LOSS OF MANUAL CONTROL OF THE VALVE. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY.


























ITEM: HDC III (2)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT













PNEUMATIC HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE, REG PNL 4 (LV7, LV8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE CAUSES ONE PNEUMATIC HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE TO REMAIN
CLOSED. A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT AFT PURGE. THIS
WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON A NOMINAL MISSION, BUT COULD
CAUSE A FIRE HAZARD DURING AN ABORT.
w REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 20
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-527
r
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ......_
PNEUMATIC HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE, REG PNL 4 (LV7, LV8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
,EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE FAILURE WILL OPEN ONE PNEUMATIC HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE. A
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF HELIUM SUPPLY.














































FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO XFER TO OPEN













PNEUMATIC HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE, PEG PNL 4 (LV7, LV8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT p_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/iR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: .... 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ERODES REDUNDANCY FOR OPENING THE PNEUMATIC H_LIUM
ISOLATION VALVE. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD PRECLUDE AFT
PURGE. AFT PURGE IS NON-CRITICAL FOR A NOMINAL FLIGHT.
w
i
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 20
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-529
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















PREM XFER TO CLOSE













PNEUMATIC HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE, REG PNL 4 (LV7, LV8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT _ HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RT_ : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IS ATO: 3/iR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAusEs _-".....PIE-CE-P_T _STRUCTURAL FAILU_; CONTAMINAtION,_ MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: :_ : "
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY COULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF HELIUM
SUPPLY.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 20



















FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO GROUND













PNEUMATIC HELIUM ISOLATION VALVE, REG PNL 4 (LV7, LV8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL PREVENT AFT PURGE. THIS WILL HAVE
NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON A NOMINAL MISSION, BUT COULD CAUSE A FIRE
HAZARD DURING AN ABORT.
w
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 20
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-531
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/03/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/iR
MDAC ID: 820 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HELIUM CROSSOVER VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILS TO XFER TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1 ) EPD&C/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SU_PPLY
3) PN_TIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE (LVI0) CONTROL
CIRCUIT




























CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
Ek_I_S OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE SHUTDOWN OF ONE
(LOSS OF MISSION). D_ING _ ABORT LOSS OF AN ENGINE IS
CRITICALITY I. THE SWITCH IS STANDBY REDUNDANT. NSTS 22206
2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR FOR FAILURES RESULTING IN AN
ENGINE SHUTDOWN.





































ITEM: HELIUM CROSSOVER VALVE TOGGLE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE XFER TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY
3) PNEUMATIC HELIUM CROSSOVER SOLENOID VALVE (LVI0) CONTROL
CIRCUIT







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE SHUTDOWN OF ONE ENGINE
(LOSS OF MISSION). DURING AN ABORT LOSS OF AN ENGINE IS
CRITICALITY i. THE SWITCH IS STANDBY REDUNDANT. NSTS 22206
2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/1R FOR FAILURES RESULTING IN AN
ENGINE SHUTDOWN.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 18.
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-533
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















HELIUM CROSSOVER VALVE CIRCUIT HDC
PREMATURE OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY









FLIGHT PHASE HDw/FUNC A_RT HDW/_C....
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTOFF : 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTSiRATioNALE:
A LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WILL CAUSE THE SHUTDOWN OF ONE ENGINE
(LOSS OF MISSION)_= DURINGAN ABORT _ _O_F_EN_!$_: _: __
cRIT_ALIT_. ....THE SWiTCHIS ST-ANDB_'_D_UND_, NSTS22206
2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR FOR FAILURES RESULTING IN AN
ENGINE SHUT_.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 18.












































HELIUM CROSSOVER VALVE CIRCUIT BLOCKING DIODES (2)
SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 18
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-535
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CIRCUIT FUSE (2)
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
EPD&C/MPS
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY _
LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV40, LV41)
SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN A LOSS OF MANUAL SWITCH OPERATION. THIS












































LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES TOGGLE SWITCH
PREM XFER TO OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 1/1
LI FTOFF: 1/1 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: i/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WOULD OPEN BOTH LV40 AND LV41. THIS WOULD CAUSE
HELIUM INGESTION IN TO THE SSME's. THIS COULD CAUSE A VEHICLE
EXPLOSION DURING ENGINE BURN.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 20











LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CIRCUIT HDC III (2)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT












LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV40, LV41)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RAT__ : _ _: __ __ ...._::__:_ ____ ::,_
THE FIRST FAILURE WILL OPEN A LO2 HELIUM MANIFOLD REPRESS
SOLENOID. A SECOND FAILURE IN THE OTHER LO2 HELIUM MANIFOLD















































LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CIRCUIT MDM OA3
FAIL OFF













LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV40, LV41)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 20
w
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-539
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CIRCUIT FUSE
OPEN












PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY ......_
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV42, LV43)!
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: " -
THE FAILURE RESULTS IN A LOSS OF MANUAL SWITCH OPERATION. THIS
WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 12
m[]
















LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES TOGGLE SWITCH
FAIL TO OPERATE, SHORT TO GROUND, XFER TO CLOSE













LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV42, LV43)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 20
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-541
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT








FAILURE MODE: FAIL OFF











LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CIRCUIT HDC III (2)
SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
EPD&C/MPS
PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY
LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV42, LV43)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3_
LIFTOFF: ...... 3/3 TAL: _7S _
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _ _ _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTs/PJ&TIONA_:
THE FAILURE WILL PREVENT REPRESSURIZATION FOR LANDING, BUT COULD













REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 20
I
















LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES CIRCUIT MONITOR MDM
FAIL OFF













LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESS VALVES (LV42, LV43)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 20
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-543
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/03/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 832 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRANSIENT SUPPRESSION DIODE --
SHORT
I_AD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) EPD&C/MPS
2) PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK ......... -
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FIRST FAILURE ERODES REDUNDANCY. A SECOND FAILURE WITHIN THE HDC
WILL GROUND THE SOLENOID AND PREVENT THE CROSSOVER VALVE FROM
OPENING.











































TOGGLE SWITCH, 2P3T (3)
SHORT TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM
3) HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV59, 61, 63)
4) AV BAY 4, 5, 6
5) ALCA I, 2, 3
6) MPCA i, 2, 3
7) PANEL R2
8) TOGGLE SWITCH (S9, 10, ii)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE (LOSS OF
MISSION) IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE LOST. THE SWITCH IS STANDBY
REDUNDANT. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIGNMENT OF 3/IR FOR
FAILURES RESULTING IN AN ENGINE SHUTDOWN.




REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-545
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/03/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT:




ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I (6)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT













HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LVS§_ 61, 63)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL. _FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
THE FAILURE COULD INHIBIT THE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
WILL CREATE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.
THIS












































REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER (6)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT













HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV59, 61, 63)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE COULD INHIBIT THE ABILITY TO CLOSE THE VALVE.
WILL CREATE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT.
THIS
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 17, 18, 19
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-547
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT





























ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM -
HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV59, 61, 63)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF : 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ] A
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIO_A_i _ _ _i _ _ __ _:_ _
THE FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE (LOSS OF
MISSION) IF ALL REDUNDANCY WERE LOST. NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES










































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/05/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C/MPS FLIGHT: 3/1R





LEAD ANALYST: B. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPD&C/MPS
2) ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR





A[ 2 ] B[ F] C [ P]
CAUSES: PIECE'PART STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FAILURE ERODES BLOCKING REDUNDANCY FOR OPEN SOLENOID POWER.
AN INTERNAL SWITCH SHORT TO GROUND COULD ELIMINATE THE ABILITY TO
OPEN THE "IN" SOLENOID. THE LOSS OF ONE ENGINE IS POSSIBLE.
NSTS 22206 2.3.3L REQUIRES ASSIG_NT OF 3/IR FOR FAILURES
RESULTING IN AN ENGINE SHUTDOWn.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 17, 18, 19
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-549
h_
INDEPENDENT ORBITER_ASSESSMENT





























ENGINE HELIUM SYSTEM .........
HELIUM INTERCONNECT INLET VALVES (LV59, 61, 63)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [NA ] B [NA ] C [NA ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _ :_: _ _
THE FAILURE WILL HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS72-941102 SHEETS 17, 18, 19























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/03/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LO2 MANIFOLD REPRESS REGULATOR (PRS)
SENSE PORT CLOGGED































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-551
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET _
DATE: 2/15/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






LH2 MANIFOLD REPRESSURIZATION REGULATOR (PR6)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, INTERNAL LEAKAGE_










































































PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY RELIEF VALVE (RV4)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED





























REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-553
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




2/15/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT: 2/1R




LH2 FEED MANI!OLD RTLS REP_SSURIZTION ORIFICE
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE

























































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-554 mm
m
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/15/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: 1/1
MDAC ID: 905 ABORT: /
ITEM: PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY FILTER (FL5)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS :















REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-555
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT




2/16/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MPS FLIGHT : I/i




ENGINE HELIUM LINE _(CV25,26,36,37,41,42 TO
=
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE
















































































ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY LINE (LVI,2,3,4 TO
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-557
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/16/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT: i/I
MDAC ID: 908 ABORT: /
ITEM: ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY LINE (PRI,2,3,7,8,9 TO
CV5,6,7,29,40,45)
FAILURE MODE: RUPTURE/LEAKAGE











































































ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY LINE (CV5,6,7,29,40,45 TO
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /






REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-559
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










HELIUM INTERCONNECT IN LINE (LV59,61,63 TO
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT























































HELIUM INTERCONNECT OUT LINE (LV60,62,64 TO
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE


































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-561
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









HELI _ METALLIC BOSS SEALS (K SEALS)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
































NAFLEX HELIUM TANK SEALS (FOR TK4)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE

































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-563
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT












COMBINATION HELIUM TANK SEALS (FOR TK6, 8, i0)
RUPTURE/LEAKAGE




























































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/17/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS (3)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION

































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-565
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/17/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:






PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY PRESSURE TRANSDUCER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION






































































ENGINE HELIUM REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE
ERRONEOUS INDICATION












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /























PNEUMATIC HELIUM REGULATOR OUTLET PRESSURE
ERRONEOUS INDICATION


















































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 2/17/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MPS FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 919 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:





































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-569
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









ENGINE HELIUM SUPPLY TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCERS (6)
ERRONEOUS INDICATION _






























































PNEUMATIC HELIUM SUPPLY TEMPERATURE TRANSDUCER
ERRONEOUS INDICATION











SUBSYS LEAD: W.J. MCNICOLL
CRITICALITIES






















REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-571
w
INDEPENDE_ ORBITER ASSESS_NT







ITS: GN2 PAGE DIS CO_E_ (PD14)
FAILURE MODE: RU_/_GE














































































































REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-573
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










DAMAGE TO CONNECTING COMPONENT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /





A[ ] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS WAS GENERATED IN RESPONSE TO NASA FMEA/CIL 0901-1.
NOT THINK A FMEA/CIL IS REQUIRED.
IOA DOES
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 03/11/88 E-574
wAPPENDIX F _ _"_
N_SA FMEA TO IOA WORF_HEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMHENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA
and corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix
E and MDAC Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-22. The Appendix F
identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment Number, NASA









IOA recommends generating a FMEA for the
subject failure mode
IOA recommends generating a FMEA for the
subject failure mode with lower criticality
and/or screens
I0A recommends generating a FMEA for the
subject failure mode with higher criticality
and/or screens
IOA concurs with RI/NASA reevaluation









NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEETCROSSREFERENCE/ RECOMMENDATIONS
: IDENTIFIERS ,," NASA ,," IOA RECOMMENDATIONS* ,'
: NASA t IOA t:CRIT t SCREENS :tCRIT C SCREENS I OTHER : ISSUE
I FMEANUMBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBER _: HW/F I A B C I_HWIF : A B C I (SEELEGENDCODE) 1 -_
























































































































P NAP If 312R
HA NA NA II I
NA NA NA :: I
NA NA HA II /
NA HANA If I
HAHA HA I I I
NA NA NAII I
NA NA NA If 2/IR
NA HAHA II 211R
P F P _: I
NANAN:} If_ /
P F P II t
NA HA HA II I
NA NA HA I: /
HA NA NAil I
P F P :i i/[
NA NA NA It /
P P P ',I liI
P F P I; I/t
P F P :I ltt
NA NA [,IA _ !
P F F ;_ .311R
NANA NA II 31tR
P F P I',_/tR
F F I_ 3itR
P F F II _/l_
NA NA NA I: I
NANA NAII 1
F P t l til
P F P l', I/l
P P P Ii III
NA NA NA II /
HA HANA II I
P F P I I _IIR
NA HA NA :I I
P F P ',: 2/2
N_ NA NA _I I
P F P II 31tR
P F P _ ;II
P F P I I 31IR
F P II I
HA HA NA ',',I
F P ;_ _Jl
5







P F F 1,3







NA NA HA I, 4
NA NA NA 1, 4
NANA NA [, 4
2
P F P £,3
P F P I,+
P F P t,_
P F P t, 3
P P P t,_
5
NA NA RA 1_ 4
HANA NA [.
NA NANA iv 'q
5
5
P P P t, 3
5
NA NA NA L, 3
5
P P P t,_
NANA NA I_ q
P P P i, 3
I
5














IDENTIFIERS II NASA :: IOA RECOMMENDATIONS
NASA : IDA :ICRIT : SCREENS II CRIT I SCREENS _ OTHER : ISSUE
FMEANUMBER t ASSESSMENTNUMBER_:HWIF I A B C :IHW/F : A H C I (SEELEGENDCODE) :






































































































































21JR I P F P :_ 111
211R : P NA P I: I
3/3 : NA NA NA :I £11
Ill I NANA NA II !
313 I NABA NA 11 I
211R I F F P _I 313
1il ; NA NA _A ;I t
311R I P F P II I
o/J311R : P F P _ ""
Itl I NA NA NA II I
21_R t P F P _I 313
211R I P F P ,," 311R
tlt _ NA NA NA _l I
111 I NA NA NA II /
111 I NA NA NA II l
313 t NANA NA It !
1/1 : NA NA NA 11 211R
2ttR I P F P II t
21IR I P F P II 311R
3/3 I NANANA II 211R
3/3 I NANANA II I
21IR : II 311R
211R I P F P II t
313 I NA NA NA II I
II[ I NA NA NA ;_ 211R
31IR I P F P II I
31tR I P F P II I
2/IR I P F P 11 I
3/3 I NANANA II /
31IR I P F P _I l
_!tR t P F P II I
313 I HA NANA _ 1
ill I NA NA NA II 21LR
31tR _ P F P _I I
3iIR I P F P II /
2/1R ; P F P tl I
313 i NA NA NA i_ l
3iIR I P F P I_ I
211R I P F P II I
3tIR I P P P 11 /
313 I NA NA NAII 1
21IR I P F P II /
31tR I P F P II I
3/3 i NA NA NA II 1
3itR i P P P 11 I
21IR I P F P ,," I
31IR _ P F P II /
3/IR I P P P II t
313 I NA NA NA ]I /
211R _ P F P II /
"=----===_'==_ Sl ::::::::::::::::::::: I =='_==='=
NANA NAI I, 4 X
15
NANANA I I, 4 X
15
15
NANANA _ I_3 X
12
15
NA NA _4A', L, 3 X
15
NA _4AWA ', L, 3, 4 X





P F P II_S X
12
P F P lI, 3 X
P F P 11,4 X
15
P F P ',1,3 X
15
:5
























IDEHTIFIERS ",, NASA I! IOA RECOMMENDATIONS*
.........................................I! ...............I! ...............................................
NASA I IOA IICRIT I SCREENS I!CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE I



















































































I! 211R I P F P I! I
II 3/IR I P P P I! I
I! tfl I HA HA HA I! /
I! 21IR _P F P I! /
II 3/IR IP P P II I
II 3tlr I P P P I! I
11 211R IP F P I! !
I! 2/IR I P F P I! /
I! 211R I P F P I! I
11 211R I P F P I! I
I! 3i1R I P F P I! 211R
I! 3/1R I P F P I! 2/IR
II 21_R I P F P II I
II 21tR I P F P II !
I! 3/IR I P P P I! I
11 311R I P P P II !
I_ 31tR I P F P I! 2/tR
I! 2/tR I P F P I! I
I! 2i1R I P F P _I !
",, 21IR I P F P. II I
II 3/tR I P P P ,,"3/1R
_C 211R I P P P I! SIS
I! 21tR _ P F P 11 I
II 21!R I P F P II 313
I! 2!JR I P P P II 3/3
_I 2iIR I P F P I! /
II 3iLR i P F P I! 513
I! 313 I HA NA NA II /
I! IlL _ HA HA HA I! _13
I! IlL I NA NANA I! 3/5
I_ 3i_ I HA HA HA I! /
_I ill i NA HA _A II 2/LR
_I 3/3 I NANANA II I
I! 21[R I P F P I! I
I! 3/3 I NA HA NA II I
II 31IR I P r P 11 31LR
I! 21LR I P F P ,," /
I! 313 I HA HA HA II /
I! Lit I HAHA HA II /
II 211R I P HA P II t
11 311R I P F P II IlL
I! IlL I NAHAHA II /
I! 2/LR I P F P I! /
II [tt I HA HA _A I! I
1_ 2/LR _ P F P 11 1































































: IDENTIFIERS :I NASA I_ IOA RECOMMENDATIONS,
x
NASA ] IOA ;ICRIT _ SCREENS tl CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER _ ISSUE t






































































































































































































































































































































































IDENTIFIERS I: NASA :: IOARECOMMENDATIONS* =
.......................................... I_ .................. _I............... ,, ....... _-:------? ..............
NASA IOA i_ CHIT I SCREENSI: CHIT _ SCREENS_ OTHER = ISSUE I
FMEANUMBER ASSESSMENTNUMBERII HN/F I A B C IIHW/F I A B C I (SEELEGENDCODE} I I


































































































)I I/I ) NA NA NA :: /
li t/t _ NA NA NA I_ I
)l Ill ( NA NA NA _ i
",,313 I NA NA NA i) 311R
",, 2/IR ) P F P il Ill
I_ t _ _ 313
II i/l ) NA NA NA II /
II 3/3 ) NA HA NA ,,_'/
",, 2/1R _ P F P ,," 313
_I I/I ) NA NA NA )) I
II III I NA NA NA II 3/IR
II 311R I P F P II 313
_ 311R _ P F P Ii I/I
II I/L I NA NANA II /
)) 311 ) NA NA NA )) /
II 21IR I P F P II 313
)_ I/l I NA NA NA I( /
II 3/[R I P F P II 3/3
11 ! ( NA NA NA II Ill
ii 2/IR IP F P )) lit
)) 3/3 ; NANANA I) l
)_ Itt I HA NA HA _I I
I) 3/kR ) P F P II I
II 2tlR I P F P II 1
_ 21IR : P P P )) /
)I 3/IR ) P F P )I I
" 3/IR ) P F P )i Ii;
211R I P F P II I
I 313 : NA NA NA _l /
: 211R ) P F P )_ l
( 311R I P F P 11 I
I 5/3 I _A NA NA II t
I 21IR i P P P II I
: _tiR : P F P _I 1
I 2ilR I P F P _ I
31IR i P P P II /
I 3t3 I NA NA NAII I
i 2/tR I P F P II /
2ItR_P F P _: /
I 313 I RANAHA _ Y
3/IR I P P P II /
;_ 2/tR : P F P II /
II 21iR I P F P I_ /
,," 111% NA MAHA _ /
II llI I NAHANA )) /
II llI I NANA NA I) I
)I 1/! ) NA NA NA II Y























































































............. . ....................... ..wm. .......... ..o. .......... Q..o ................. . ...... m._.im_._.--.. .......
IDENTIFIERS 11 NASA I: IOA RECOMMENDATIONS,
NASA I IOA :ICRIT : SCREENS IICRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE





































































































































































NA NA NA ii
NA NA NA II
NA NA NA II
NA HA NA If
NA HA NA If
NA NA NA If
NA NA NA If
NA NA NA If
HA HA NA II
NA NA NA II
NA NA HA If
HA NA NA II
HA NA NA If
NA NA NA If
HA NA NA II
NA NA NA If
NA NA NA II
HA HA NA If
NA NA NA If
P F P 11
P F P II
P F P II
P F P _I
NA NA HA I
P P P I
NA NA NA I
P F P I
NA NA HA
NA _A NA ',
P P P I
NA NA NA I
NA NA NA I
P F F II
P P P II
NA NA NA ',I
P F P I





NA NA NA :
NA NA NA I
NA NA NA :
NA NA NA If
NA NA NA If
NA NA NA If
NA NA HA II
NA NA NA If








































































































IDENTIFIERS If NASA If IOARECOMKENDATIONS*
I.......................................... I......,...... °--,I................................................ I
NASA I IDA ',I CRITI SCREENSIf CRITI SCREENSI OTHER I ISSUE
FMEANUMBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBERIf HWIF: A B C If HW/F I A B C I (SEELEGENDCODE) I



































































































































l_ANA NA II ! I
NA NA NA ',l / I
NA NA NA II / I
NA NA NA II ! I
P F P II / I
P F P II 2/JR IP P P
P F P II 211RIP P P
NA NA NA If !
NA NA NA II I I
P F P II / I
NA NA NA II / I
NA NA NA II t I
NA NA NA II I I
NA NANA II / I
NA NA NA II I I
NA NANA II t I
NANA NA II ! I
NA NA NA II t I
NA HA NA II t I
MA NA HA If /
NA NA NA If I
NA NA NAII / I
NA NA NA II / I
NANA NA II / I
NA _ NA II I I
P P P II i I
NA N_ NA II I I
_A NA NA II I I
NA ._ANA :I I
NANANA ii 3!3 I NANA HA
NANA NA ',I / I
NA NA NA 11 I I
NAltANA II / I
P F P II ! I
NA _iANA II l I
NA NA NA II / l
P F P II 311R I P P P
P P P II / I
_A NA HA I I I I
P F P II 313 ', NANANA
P F P II / I
NA NA NA II ! I
P F P II ! I
P F P II f I
HA NA NAII I I
NA NA NAII l
NA NA NA If I































































IDENTIFIERS :I NASA II IOA RECOMMENDATIONS*
NASA I IOA IICRIT I SCREENS II CRIT I SCREENS : OTHER I ISSUE

































































































II Ill I NANIINA II
If III IHA NA NA If
II III I NA NA NA II
II llI I NAHANA II
]I 3/tR I P F P If
If 3/3 I HA NA HA If
",,3/1R I P NAP "It
I', lit I NAHA HA 11
,," ill I HAN_ HA ,,"
,, III I NANANA ,,"
",, Ill I NAHANA ,,"
,," 2tIR I P F P ',I
I', _/tR ', P F P II
If 313 I HA HA NA If
II 111 I NANANA II
II 2/IRI P F P II
If 3/3 I NA NA NA If
2/IR I P F P I]
3/3 I NA HA NA If
tit I NA HA NA If
Ill I HA NA HA II
2/IR I P F P II
•d.J _ NA N_ NA If
t/I I HA HA NA If
313 I NA NA NA If
313 ,' NA HA NA If
lil I NA NA NA ]I
2itR I P F P ',',
llI ', HA NA NA ',',
21rE ; P F P
I/t I NA NA NA
313 ', NA NA NA
3/3 i NA NANA
211R',P F P
I/l ', NA.NAHA
21IR ', P F P
21IR i P F P
III I HA HA HA
,d._ I NA HA NA
lit I HA HA HA
3/3 I NA NANA
t/l I NA NA NA "
t/[ I NANA NA 11
tlt I NA _qANA ,",
Ill I NA HA NA ',I
Ift ', NAHA HA "II
Ill I HA HA HA II
t/l I NANA HA II
I/l I NA HA NA II













313 NA NA HA
I
I
21IR P F F
I
I
















































































---_..---.-.. .......... .. ...... _----- ....... ......--......4 ..... m... ...... _ ............. ...--.. ..... . .... . ..... .._--..mm--
IDENTIFIERS 11 HASA _I IOA RECOMMENOATIONS,
I NASA I IDA IICRIT I SCREENS IICRIT I SCREENS I oTHER I ISSUE I
I FMEANUMBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBER ItHWIF I A B C II HWIF I _ B D I (SEELEGENDCODE) I I
' ' 11 II I ' I I


























































































































11 ill I NANA NA iI 313 _ NA NANA
II 111 I NANA NA II l %
II ill I NANANA II I I
II III I NA NA NA II / I
II I/I I NANANA II / I
II I/I I NA NA NAII / I
II I/I I NANANA II / I
II Lit I HA NA NA II I ;
11 I/I I NA HA NA I I I
II t/I I NA NA NA I / I
II 2fIR I P F P I / I
II _t_ I NA NA NA I
II 313 I NANA NA I
II 313 I NA NA NA I
3/3 I NANA NA I
I/l I NA N_ NA
313 I NANANA I
oi+ I NANA NA
tit I NA NA NA 11
[/t I NA NA NAII
[/I I NA NA NAII
ill I NA NA NAII
2ilR I P F P II
2/IR I P F P
I/I ; NANA HA
3/tR I P F P I
313 I NANANA ]
2ttR I P F P t
i/l I HA HANA I
ill I NA NA NAt
SIIR I P P P I
_I_ I NA NA HA II
211R ',P F P II
211R I P F P II
313 I _A 14A_A II
313 I NA NA HA _;
Ill I HA NA HA I
3/_ I NA NA _A I
llt I NA HA NA I
31_ I NA NANA. I
III I NA NANA I
+t_ I NA HA NA ;
i11 I HA NA NA I
313 I NA NA NA I
Ill I NA NA NA I
313 I NANANA I
II! I NA NA NA I
iti I NA NA NA I






























































































IDENTIFIERS I! NASA It IOA RECOMMENDATIDNS,
..........................................I! ..............I! ...............................................
NASA I IOA I! CRIT I SCREENS I!CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER : ISSUE













































































































































NA NA NA II
NA NA HA I!
NA NA HA 11
HA NA NA I!
NA NA NA I!
NA HA NAII
NA NA NA I!
I!
HA _A NA I!
HA HA HA I!
NA NA NA I!
PFPII
P F F II
P F P I!
PFFII
NA NA NA I!
NA NA NA II
HA _A HA II
HA HA NA II
NA NA NAII
HA NA HA I
NA NA NAI
NA HA NAI
NA NA NA I





NA HA _A I
NA _A NA l
NA _A _A It
NA NA NA II
NA NA NA I!
NA NA NA I!
RA NA NA i!
NA NA NA I!
NA NA NA II
NA NA NA I!
NA HA NA I!
NA NA NAII
NA NA NA I!
PFPII
HA NA NA II
NA NA HA I:
NA NA NAII
HA HA NA I!















31LR I P F P
I I
i I
































































































IDENTIFIERS 11 NASA II IDA RECOMMENDATIONS*
I NASA I IOA II CRIT : SCREENS II CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUEI
FMEA NUMBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBERII HW/F I A B C IIHW/F I A S C I (SEELEGENDCODE) I



























































































































































































NA NA NA If I I
NA NA NA If I I
F F P II 211R I P F F
F F P II 211RI F F F
F F P II 211R I F F F
F F P II / I
F F P II 21LR IF F F
NA NA NA If / I
NANANA II 313 I P F P
NA NA NA If /
_ANA NA If / I
NA NA NA If 1 I
NA NA _A If t I
NA NA NA If t I
e F P II I I
NA NA NA If I I
NA NA NA If t I
NA NA NA If / I
P F P 11 I I
NA N_ NAII t I
t_ANA NA If t I
P F P II 313 I NANANA
NA NA NA If I I
F F P 11 t I
NA N_ NA 11 t I
NA NA NA If / I
P P P II t I
P F P 11 t i
P P P II / I
NA NA NA If .313 I NA NA NA
NA NA NA ',I I I
P NAP 11 / I
RA NANA ',I / I
NA NA NAII / I
NA NA NA If /
NA NA NA 11 / 1
NA NA NA If I I
NA NA NA If / I
NA NA NA If I I
NA NA NA II t I
NA NA NAil t I
NA NA NA II / I
NANANA II I I
NANANA 11 / I
P F F II / I
P F P II t I
NA NA NA If f_ I














































































































I IDENTIFIERS II NASA 11 IOA RECOMMENDATIONS* I
..........................................II ..............II ...............................................I
NASA I IOA IICRIT I SCREENS II CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE





























































































































NA NA NA If t
P F F II /
NA NA NA If t
NA NA NA If 1
NA NA NA If /
NA HA HA I] I
HA NA NA If /
NA NA HA If I
F P F II /
F P F II I
F P P If 211R
NA NA NA If /
P F P II I
P NA F If 3/3
NA NANA If /
_A _A NA ',', t
NANA NA II /
NA NA NA II /
NANA NA II /
NA NA NA If /
P F P If 2/IR
NA NA NA If /
NA NA NA II I
NA NA NA If I
NA NA ...qAIf /
_A NA NA ', /
NA NA NA ', /
NA NA NA I I
NA NA NA I I
_iA_iANA I /
P F P I I11
P NAP ', 3/IR






I, 111 NA NA NA
:, 2tIR P F P
', 2/1R P F P
I, 2ItR P F P
I' 21IR P F P
, /I
I /


















P F P ",, /
F F F II ill
F F F ',I 111
NA ,_4ANA 11 I
NA NA NA ,," I
P F F II I
P F F II 21IN
NA NA NAII /
NA NANA If /
P F P II /






















































IIDENTIFIERS II NASA 11 IOA RECOMMENDATIONS*
......... il _ _ I
................................. i,...... , .... %'7_71_'m ....... --................... _ ................
: NASA : IOA II CRIT I SCREENS IICRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUEI
I FMEA NUMBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBER:I HW/F I A B C _ HWIF I A B C _ (SEELEGENDCODE) I
I !





























































































































































































































































































































































































IDENTIFIERS II NASA II IDA RECOMMENDATIONS,
NASA I IOA ,,"CRIT I SCREENS ,,"CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER ',ISSUE
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NA NA NA ,," I I
NA NA NA ;I I I
NA NA NA if l I
NA NA NAII I I
NA NA NA 11 I I
NA NA NA 11 I I
NA NA NA lI / I







NA NA NA 11 I I
NA HA NA If I I
PP F' 11 t I
P P P II 1 I
P F P II t I
P F P II 1 I
P P P II / I
P F P II t I
P P P II / I
P P P II 1 I
P P P ',I I ',
i,l, IA
,',A,_|AN. ',I f 1
P F P I: t I
P F P 11 1 I
NA NA NAII / i
NA NA NAII ! I
NANA NA If l I
NA NA NA If l I
NA NA NA If / I
NANA NA If 3tLR I P F P
P NAP ]I f
P NAP' II t I
P NAP II / I
P NAP ]I I I
P NAP II / I
P NAP II / I
NA HA HA II I I
NA NA NA II / I
NANANA If / I
P P P II / I
P NAP 11 311R1P F P
NA NANA If 311R I P F P
MANANA II 311R I P F P
NANANA I; I I


































































































































































































NA NA NAII I
NA NA NA 11 I
NA NA NA 11 I
_A NA NA ;I I
NA NA NAII I
P F P [', /
PFP I', /
P F P II /
P F PII /
NA NA HA :_ I
P P P II !
HA HAHA If /
NA HA NA If /
NA NA NAII /
NA NA NA :I /
NA HA NA If I
NA NA NA _I /
NA NA HA ',1 I
HANA HA If f
NA NA NA I', /
NANA NAII t
P F P ]] 1
P F P I] /
NA HA HA II I
NA NA NA I1 I
i4ANA NA i', 2/IR
NA NA HA II /
!4AHA HA if 2/1R
NA NA NA _ /
P P P II 1
P F P ',I /
NA NA NA ',I /
HA_,_ANA 11 I
i,.',,,i_ NA NA ',I 311R
NAHAHA ',I I
!_A_A NA ;I T/tR
NA NA NA ',I i
P P P II /
PP P ',_ /
P F P I', 3/IR
P F P II 311R
P P P ',I /
PP P ',I /
PP P ',I /
P FP ',I /
P F P II 311R
P F P I] 311R
F F P II 3/IR
F F P ',_ 3/1R
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P NAP II I
P NAP II !
NA NA NA If I
P P P II /
NA NA NA If 3/IR
P R P ",, /
P P P ,," /
P P P ,," 1
P F P If 3/IR
P P P II /
NANA NA II 211R
NA NA NA If !
P P P II !
P P P II
P F P II /
P F P II 1
P F P Ii /
P F P II /
P P P II t
p p p ,, /
II
P P P II t
P P P II I
P P P ",, I
P NAP " II 1
NANANA ',', I
HA NA NA 11 I
NA _A NA ',I 1
P P P II I
_tANA NAII !
II 313
P P P II 1
P P P II I
P P P II I
P P P II l
P F P II I
P F P " I
P P P II I
P P P II l
P P P ",, I
NANA14A11 /
P P P 11 /
P P P ',', _./1
P P P II /
NA NA NA ',_ t
P P P 11 f
P P P 11 /
P P P II /
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31IR I P F P I: I
3/IR I P F P II 311R P P P
I 2/IR I P P P Ii I
I 311R I P P P I: /
11 2/IR P P P II /
II 3FIR I P P II /
II 3/IR I P P :I I
11 31IR I P P P I I
2/tR I P P P ;I I
11 3/IR P P P II /
,," 2/tR I P P ,," !
,, 2/IR P P P ,," /
,, 21tR I P P ]I /
,," 31IR P NA P ,," I
",, 3tIR P NAP II /
,," 211R I P P II I
,, ill NA NA NA 1," I
,, 31IR I P P ,, I
,, 31IR P P P ,, I
11 2/IR I P P P I t
II 31IR I P F P I t
I, 21tR I P F P 'I I
l I 21LR t P P P I f
i 2IiR I P P P ]] /
_I 2/1_ I P P P ]I I
II 211R P P P II 1
II 3/3 INA N_ NA _ /
II t/i I_JANA NA I /
I .a..a _ NA NANA l i I
II 211R P P P II I
11 313 I NA NA NA 1 31IR P F P
I 31_ I I4ANA NA i_ /
I' _/1R i P P P _i 313
II 31IR P P P II 31IR
II 31tR I P. P ,," 311R
",, 3/tR P. P P II /
il 3tIR I P P ,," 1
I, 31IR I P P P 11 I
,," 31IR I P F P 11 /
" 3/1R I P F P " III
II 3ttR I P F P II /
,," 31IR I P P P II I
,," 31IR I P F P I_ t
I 3/1R I P F P II /
I 3!tR I P F P II t
I 3IIR I P F P II t
I 31tR I P F P II I
I 31IR I P P P II /
I 3/IR I P P P il I






















































I............................ -r.-- ................. ,-,,7,_-o_-_ .......... ,_ ....... "_',t-_ ..... - ................
I IDENTIFIERS _I NASA II IOA RECOMMENDATIONS*
I NASA I IDA I] CHIT I SCREENSII CRtT I SCREENSI OTHER I ISSUE I





































































































































P F P II I
P F P _I I
P F P II I
P F P II 3ilR
P F P II I
P F P II I
P F P II I
P F P II I
P F P II I
P F P II !
P F P II /
P F P II I
NANANA If 21tR
NA NANA If 2/IR
PF P ',I /
NANA NA ;I 21IR
P F P ;I 21tR
P P p II t
NANANA ,," 21tR
NA NA NA ',I 2/IR
P F P II /
P F P II !
P F P _ Z/IR
P F P II I
P F P ]1 /
NA NA NA I', f
P F P II !
P F P II !
P P P ;T /
NA _iA,_AI_ 21iR
NA NA NA If /
P P P II /
NA NA NAII 2/1R
P P P II t/t
P P II /
NA NA NA If 3/tR
NA _WANAII _iIR
P P II t
NA NA NA If I
P P If 311R
P P P II /
P P P II 1
P P If _IIR
P P P _I /
P R P II 1
P P P II /
P P P II I
P F P II t
NA NANA If 311R













P F P II, q
P F P 11,4
P F P ;1,4
P P P 11,3
;5
P P P 11,4
P P P II, 4
15
15







P F P li, 4
IS
15
P P P IL, 4
NA NA NA i i, 4
15
P P P ',t, 3
P F P 11_4
12
15
P F P 11,4
15
',2
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P P P ::
P P P :_
P P P II
P P P :I
P P P ::
NA HA HA :_
NA HA HA :_
NA NA HA ::
NA HA NAil
P NAP ',_
p p p ',',
P P P I:
P P P :_
P P P I:
P P P I_
P P P ::
HAHA NA 11
NA NA NA ::
NA NA NA ',:
NA NA t._A',;












P P P I:
P P P II
P F P II
P F P ',',
P F P _
P P P I:
HA NA HA :I
P P P :l
NA HA HA I I
NA HA HA II
P F P _I
i_AHA NA ',I
I_ /










3/IR P F P
311R P F P




31JR P HA P
3iIR P NAP












3/3 NA NA NA
!
313 NA NA _A
313 NA NA NA
!
312R P P P




31tR P P P
31IR P F P
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II 3/IR I P F P II /
II 313 I NANANA If I
II 311R I P P P II I
Ii 3/1R I P P P If .3/3
II 3/IR IP P P II t
_',,313 I NA NA RA If I
,", 3/3 ',NA NANA II I
,," 211R I .P F P If 311R
,," 211R I F F P II 311R
,,"211R ',F F P ,,"211R
,,"313 I NA NANA ,," I11
If .'313 I NA NANA ,," f
If 211R I F F P ,," 21LR
II 211R ',F F P II 3/1R
II 313 ] NANANA If I
I) "" NA NANA I•a/-a ] _ I11
11 211R I F F P II 2/IR
II 211R I P P P II I
_I 3ilR ', P P P If .313
11 31LR I P P P II 31.3
II 311R I P P P II 31.3
11 3tlR I P P P If 3/3
",, 2/IR I P P P If 3t.3
" 31tRIP P P " I#l
",, 31tR i F F P ,, ..,,.,
I 313 I NANANA _I 1
I 31LR i P P P ,," 3iIR
I 313 IRA NA NA If I
•_,'IR P F P II 31:3
I 31tR I P F P If 313
I 31LR I P F P 11 211R
I 311R I P P P _', 311R
; 3/IRIF' P P II 3/1R
I .313 I NA NA NA If t
I 311R', P P P 11 311R
',: 3/IN', P P P Ii 311R
" ,a/•._ I _'JANA NAII fii
,," 311R I P F P ,," 3i3
ii
,, .31tRI P F P I_ I
;I 311R IP F P 1I t
II 3i.3 I NA NANA If I
II 3tlR I P F P II /
II 31LR I P F P II !
II 313 I NA NA NA If I
If 311R I P F P If /
II 3t1R I P F P II t
II 311R I P F P II I
" 311R I P F P II I
II 313 I NA NA NA II f
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P P P I: 3/IR
NANA HA I1 311R
NA NA HA l: 3/IR
P P P II 3/IR
HA NA NAII /
NANA IIA II /
HANA NA II /
P F P II /
HANA HA If 31tR
NANANA If 3/IR
P F P II /
NA NI_HA If /
HA NA HA If I
NA NAHA ',I I
P F P II I
F F P II !
NA NA NA II /
F F P II /
NA NA HA II /
NA NA NA I; /
NA NA NA 11 /
NA NA NA ',; /
NA NA HA I', /
P F P II /
NA NA NA :I /
P F P II I
NA NA NA 11 1
NANA NAII I
P P P ;; /
NANA RA I; /
P F P I', t
PF P I', /
PP P I', 1
P P P 11 t
P P P II !
P P P l', t
P P P I', !
P P P It /
P F P II /
P F P II I
P F P II 1
P P P 11 /
P P P II /
P F P II /
P F P II t
P F P II /
PF P ',I f
P F P II I
P F P II I
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P F P I; t
P F P l; I
P P P It /
P F P II /
P F P II /
P P P II /
P P P II /
NA NA NA II t
PPF" tt t
NA_A NA I_ /
P F P _ /
NA NA NA II /
P F P _I /
HA NANA _I t
P F P :: /
NANI_NA ;_ f
I_ANA NA l{ :fIR
P P P I_ 31JR
NA NA NA _ /
P P P I; 3/IR
NA NA NA If I
P P P If 3/IR
NA NA NAil /
P P P ,,"311R
NA NA NA _ I
3/[R P P P I
313 NA NA NA i
•_,. P P P l
3/3 NA HA NA
31[R P F P
311R g F P I


























NA NA NA ',I 31tR
NA NA NA II I
NA NA NA ]I I
,P F P ,," 313
NA NA NA I', !
P F P ',I3/IR
NA NA NAII I
P FP I', /
NANA NA t_ /
P F P tl /
NA NA NA I_ I
P F P I_ /
NA NA NA _', f
P P P 1; f
NA NA HA If I
P F P II l
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P F P I I
P F P ', 311R
NA NA NA I I
P F P I 31tR
P F P 1 I
P P P 1 31IR
NA NA NA I I
NA NA NA _ t
P NAP l l
NA NA NA _ 311R
NA NA NA I t
NA NA NA I t
NANA NA ] 3IIR
P NAP ] 3/iR
P P P I 1
NANA NA I 3;iR
NA NA NA ', 311R
NA NA NA I 311R
P P P : /
P NAP I 3/iR
P NAP ] 3/IR
P P P I 1
P P P I I
NA NA NA I t
NA NA HA ':I /
P F P ',', t
P F P _', ]
P F P I_ I
P F P II /
P FF' I_ /
P F P :I I
P F P ,," !
PF P I', /
NA NA NA II I
NA NA NA 11 /
P P P 1_ 1
P P P I
P P P 1
P P P t
P P P /
P P P I
P P P 1
P P P I
P P P /
P P P I
P P P /
P P P /
P F P I
P F P f
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II 3/LR I P F P
II 31tR I P F P
II 3/iR I P F P
II 31IR I P F P
II _IIR I P F P
II 311R I P F P
II S/JR I P F P
II 311R I P F P
II 3/IR I P F P
II 31IR I P P P
II 31LR I P P P
II 31IR I P P P
II 31LR I P P P
II 311R I P P P
II 31JR _ P P P
II 31tR I P P P
II 3/tR I P P P
If 31_R I P F P
If 3IIR I P F P
I, ._R I P F P
II 3I_R I P F P
II 3/IRIP P P
If 31tR I P P P
II 311R I P F P
,'I 3!£R I P = P
II 311R I P F P
II 31iR I P F P
II _/_R I F' P P
II 3itR _ P P P
II 3/IR _ P F P
II 31tR I P F P
I_ 3/IR I P F P
II 31[R I P F P
II 21IR I P P P
II 2ilR I P P P
i', UIR I P F F'
II 3/IR I P F P
11 3fIR I P F P
II 31LR I P F P
11 21LR I P P P
II 2/IR _ P P P
II 3t3 I NA NA NA
II 313 I NA NA NA
11 313 I NA NA NA
II 3/3 I NANA NA
II 3t3 I NA NA NA
II 3t_ I NANA NA
II 313 I NA NA NA
II 3t_ I NANA NA
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It 3/IR ; P
I I 3tIR ; P
l; 3/IR I P
I I 'T '5'
11 ,,I / .,,} _ NA
,, 31IN _ P
,,"313 I NA
,, 313 ] NA
iI
,, 311R _ P
,," 311R ',P














,, 211R I P
1 2/JR I P
I 21tR I P
I 3iI.R ', P
,," 2/IR',P
,," 2/JR ,' P
i I
,, 3/3 I NA












, 31.3 _ NA
', 2]lR t P
', 313 I NA
;, 211R t P
I' 313 _NA




P P II 3/3
P P I_ 3/3
P P " I
NA NA ,," I
F P " 1
NA NA ,," /
NA NA " /I|
F P " /I I
F P " /II
P P I /














P P ,,1 1
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11 3/[R : P P P II /
I_ 2/tR ; P P P IT I
:; 31LR _ P F P II /
II 31iN I P F P II I
:: 3/1R ; P P P II /
II 2/iR I P P P 11 /
:l 3/IR : P F P :I I
11 3/3 I NANA NAII i
II 2/IR I P P P II I I












,, 313 I NA NA HA II 311R I P P P _ 1,4
311R I P P P II 311R I P F P I I, 4
21JR I P P P II I I ; 5
313 INANAHA II f l I 2
2/1R I P P P I{ 3ttR I P P P I 1, 3
3/3 I NANAHA {
3/3 INA NANA I
3/3 I NA NANA I
3/1R : P P P I
3/IR = P P P =
313 { NA NA NA
3/3 I NA NANA I
31[RIP P P I
,, 3/1R I P F P I
",,3Y3 ; NA NA NA I
I : 15
I I 15
311R I P F P I t,4
313 I NA HAHA I t,3
311R I P P P ',t, 4
/ l 12
313 I NA NA NA I I,
/ I ',5
II 3/3 I NA _A NA I: I _ I 5
II 3/tR I P F P I: 3/3 ] NA NA NA I t, 3
,, 311R I P F _..... NA ' "• . o1_ I _A,_A _ l,
II 3/3 I HA HA HA II I I I 5
II 3/IN I P F P II 313 ; NA NA HA I [,3
II 31tR I P F P II 313 I NAHANA I t,3
II 3/3 I NANANA II 311R I P F P I 1, ¢
II 3/3 i NAN_ HA II / I
II 3/IN i P NA P _I / l
II 313 ; NA HA NAII I
II 313 I NA NA NA 11 1 I
l_ 313 I NANANA II I I
II [11 I HA NANA II / I
II 3/3 I NA NA NA II / l
II 21IR I P P P {l 1 I
II 313 I HA NA NA.II 1 I
II 21tR I P F P II / I
,," 313 I NANA NA ,," I l
;I 3i3 : _A NAHA II I l
II 3/3 I HA NANA II t I
II 3t3 I HA NA NA I_ / I

















II 21tR I P F P II 3/tR I P F P I L, 3
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NA NA NA %_
NA NA NA ',',
P F P ',%
NA NA NA _
NA NA NA I t
NA NA NA :_
NA NA NA _
NA NA NA _
P P P _
P P P _
P P P _l
P P P _i
P P P _
P P P ]l
P P Ptt
P P P II
pP P ',]
P P P ',_
P P P _
p p P _',
P P P _t







P F P ',
P F P ',
P F P ',
P F P ',
P F P I
P F P ',
P F P
P F P I




P F P ',
P F P ',
p p p ',
p p p ',
P F P tl
P F P II
P F P _
P F P II
PP P I',




































































































I IDENTIFIERS _ NASA II IOARECOMMENDATIONS* I
NASA I 10A II CRITI SCREENSi
I FMEANUMBER I ASSESSMENTNUMBER_I HWIF I A B C






















































































3/1R P F P
3IlR P F P
311R P F P
3/IR P F P
2/1R P P P
211R P P P
d._ NA NA NA
3/3 NA HANA
311R P P P
3/1R P P P
313 NA NA NA
3/3 NA NA NA
3/3 NA NA NA
3/3 NA NA NA
2/IR P P P
3/3 HA HA NA
2/IR P P P
3/3 NA NA NA
_/iR P P P
21iR F F P
3ilR P P P
2/IR F F P
3/IR P F P
3t3 NA NA NA I
3/IR P F P I
._'/3. NA.NA NA
313 NA HA NA
_/t_ P F P
3/3 HA NA NA
3/tR P P P
311R P P P I
/_ NA NA NA I
3/£R P P P
3t3 HA HA NA
._/_ NA NA HA I
313 NA NA NA
3!3 NA NA NA
313 NA NA NA l
3t3 HA NA NA
3/3 NA NA NA I
_13 HA NA HA I
3t3 NA NA NA I
313 NA NA NA II
3/3 NA NA NAII
3t3 NANA NAII
3t3 NAHA NA I_
ot_ NA NA NA II
3/3 HA NA HA _I
311R P F P II
31£R P F P "
ii
I!
i CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE:







I 311R P F P 1_ 4 X
I 311R P F P 1, 4
I 3i3 NA NANA L, 3 X










I 313 HA HA NA t X













31tR P F P I_ 4 X
3t1R P P P l, 4 X





























































































































3/LR ', P F P ',1
3/LR I P F P 1_
3/LR ', P P P 11
S/LR ] P P P 11
3/1R ] P F P 1',
3/IR I P F P I]
3/IR ] P F P _
311R I P F P I_
31tR I P P P I_
31tR _ P P P I_ I
,do _ HA NANA I, 1
3/3 ] NA NANA 11 /
3/3 I HANA NA I_ /
3/3 ] HANA NA _I /
3/3 I NAHA HA II /
3I].R ] P F P 1', /
SIIR ] F F P II I
31tR I P F P _I 31
313 ] NA NA NA I!
3/3 ', NANA HA I',
3/3 _ NANA HA I_
3/3 I NANA NA _I
3/3 I HA NA NA II
313 I NA NA NA _I
313 _ HA HA NA "l!
313 ', NA NA NA "
313 I NA NA NA II
313 : NA NA NA 11
3/3 =NA NA NA 11
3i3 ', NA _4ANA ',',
313 iNA NA NA "I I
3tlR ', F F P ,",
3t3 ] NA NA HA ',',
3/tR ', F F P "
3/IR : P F P _:
311R ',P P P I_
3/tR _ P F P :l
3/tR I P F P ::
3/tR ',P P P II
313 ', NA NA NA 11
313 I HA NA NA I!
313 ',NA NA NA _1
31tR I P F P _1
311R I P F P I!
31tR I F F P _',
311R I F F P II
3/tR I P P P 1_
3/IR I P P P ;I
































































































I IDENTIFIERS I! NASA II IDARECOMMENDATIONS*
t.......................................... I!.................. II................................................ t
NASA t IDA It CRITI SCREENSI_CRITI SCREENSI OTHER : ISSUE















































































II 31IR I P F P I_ t
" 3/IR t P F P I! f
I_ 3/IR I P P P II /
I! 3/IR : P F P II I
II _IIR ; P F P I! /
II 31IR t P F P I: I
_I 3/IR : P F P II I
I_ 311R : P P P II t
I! 311R I P P P ,," /
I! 3/3 I HANANA II /
II 3/3 [ NAHA HA [I /
II 3/3 I NANA NAII /
11 3t3 I NAHA NAII t
II 3/3 ] NA HA NAII 1
It 313 : NAN_ NA II 31tR
II 3/3 I NANANA tl /
]I 313 ] NA HA NA I] /
Ii _tLR I P F P II 3/3
" 31LR I P F P II _'"+I _l.J
II 3IIR I P F P l: 3i3
li 313 I NANA NA II 1

















21LR _ P P P ,,"313
2!iR I P P P II 313
31_ I NA RA N6 tI I
313 _ NA NANA I! I
3/tR ; P F P :I 3t3
313 ; NANA NA II !
I I 11 313
I I ;I 111
I I It 31tR
! I ]I 311R
I I II 313
/ I I_ 313
/ I 11 31_
t I II 313
/ I II 2tIR
/ I II 313
I I 11 I
/ I II ttl
/ I I_ 1
/ I II f
t I I_ !



















P F P II, 4
15
15
NA NA NA I I,3
NANANA I I_ 3
NANA NA I t_ 3
NANA NA I I, 3
15
RA NA NA I I, 3
NANA NA ; i, 3
15
15
NA NANA ] I_ 3
15
NANANA ', I, 2
NA NANA I 1, 2
I F P 11,4
P P P I I,:5,4
NANANA ; L,2
NANA NA I t,2
NA NA NA ',t
NA NANA I i, 2
P P P II_2
NANANA I I, 2
16
NANA NA I 1, 2
NA NA NA I I, 2





































































I IDENTIFIERS II NASA II IOA RECOMMENDATIONS*
l I! " --....................
t,-.................,,-......................... '
NASA I IOA IICRIT I SCREENS II CRIT t SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE































































































































































































































I IDENTIFIERS II NASA 11 IDARECOMMENDATIONS+
.......................................... I+ .................. _:
I NASA I IOA IICRIT I SCREENS II CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUEI
I FMEA NUMBER I ASSESSMENTh_MB_ IIH_/F I A B C II HWIF i A B C I (SEELEBENDCODE) I I








































































































































































































I, 2 I X
I,2 I X
I, 2 I X
I, 2 I X
t, 2 I X
[, 2 1 X
[, 2 I X
t, 2 I
I, 2 I X
t, 2 I X
I, 2 I X
I, 3 I X
I, S I X
I_ 4 I X
I, S i X
[, 4 1 X
I, 3 I X
I, 4 I X
I, 4 I X
i, 2 I X
I, 2 I X
6
i, 2 I X
I, 2 1 X
L, 2 I X
L, 2 I X













IDENTIFIERS 11 NASA I_ IOA RECOMMENDATIONS*
I NASA ; IOA 11CBIT I SCREENS IICRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE I









































































II 211R I P
II 21tR I P
,,"211R _ P
II 313 I NA
II 315 I NA
'I 311R I P
I 3tlR I P
I 3/1R I P
I 311R I P
I _/3 I NA
I 313 I NA
313 I NA
3/IR I P
I 311R I P
I _/IR I P
311R I P
I _/IR I P
j._ I NA
I 31_ I NA
I 3/IR I P









































































































I I II I 11 I 1 I I
F-35
J
